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“As long as man is affected by the image of thing, he will
regard the thing as present even though it may not exist.” –
Baruch Spinoza
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Abstract:
In this thesis, I look at the ways in which statehood comes to be defined, practiced,
and performed through Syrian war-time migrants’ “repatriation” in Abkhazia, a small
breakaway self-proclaimed state squeezed between Russia and Georgia.1I argue that while
separatist states’ desires and aspirations towards statehood grant legitimacy to the modern
nation-state system, they at once expose the fragility of its very order. An unrecognized state
like Abkhazia still maneuvers within the system that it is locked out of, but the way that
Abkhazia, like other unrecognized states, is shunned from the ‘family of nations’ could reveal
how constructed and hallucinatory the modern state-order is. In another sense, looking at
Abkhazian state performativity, or the fictitious aura that arises from the notion of an
Abkhazian nationality, can tell us about the taken-for-granted fictitious characters of other
states. While I use the word “fictitious” here, it is important to acknowledge, as Trouillot
reminds us, that the “fictitious” has very real, felt consequences in the everyday lives of
people.2The point is not to make an anomaly out of Abkhazia because it is an unrecognized
state because, ultimately, most administrative practices in that space are not different from
other states and their own practices of make-believeness, a term coined by Yael NavaroYashin.3 In other words, what can the theatrical and ritualistic practices of Abkhazian
statehood around the Syrian war-time migrants tell us about similar practices in other, both
unrecognized and recognized, states? From here on, one can conjure questions on what it
means for a state to be sovereign within a certain territory, as well as questions that delve
deeper into how it is that subjects of states imagine (or feel) the entity and/or notion of the
state to begin with. How does this state project manifest itself in the movement of people
across (un)recognized borders, in document production, and in the rhetoric of war? My
argument therefore also entails the problematization of a variety of taken-for-granted
categories, including ethno-national categories, the classification of “the refugee,” the state,
the nation, as well as that of war. The idea is that these categories, often considered “problem
categories,” stem from and float around the concept of the “state.” Yet, this thesis posits the
prospect that the state is the problem category.4My thesis also branches from conceptualizing
the corporeal practices of the state to include war-making and document production as
nation-building practices. Both such practices also contribute to the generation of “state-less
peoples,” or “refugees.” This thesis is split into six parts, each of which I detail with its own
abstract immediately below.

1

I use the world “self-proclaimed” whilst still maintaining the belief that all “states” are “self-proclaimed,” in a
sense, only that some have more recognition than others. The politics of recognition are themselves entrenched
in a web of social, political, and economic power relations as this thesis touches upon.
2
Trouillot, Michel- Rolph, Haiti, State Against Nation: the Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism(New York :
Monthly Review Press, 1990.) pg. 24
3
Navaro-Yashin, Yael. The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Post War Polity(North Carolina :
Duke University Press, 2012.)
4
This idea was inspired by comments made by Professor Hanan Sabea.
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Notes on Transliteration, Translation, and Style

I used the International Journal for Middle East Studies (IJMES) system for Arabic
transliteration and the Library of Congress system for the few Russian words used. All
translations are my own. Please also note that I use the word sharkas interchangeably with
Circassian and the words Abazāt (in Syrian dialect) and Abazīa (in Egyptian dialect)
interchangeably with “Abazas,” a term which will be defined in the introduction of this
thesis. Names of all my interlocutors have been changed. Indented paragraphs represent
chunks of my field notes.

9

Preface
Displaced, Emplaced, and Replaced: Problematizing “Refugee-ness”

A pin on Layla’s backpack that has a Circassian flag reads “Adyghe.” The Adyghe are one of the
peoples of the North West Caucasus region. (Figure 1)

A Circassian flag, and the identification card of a Circassian fighter is one of many documents on
display at the Abkhazian National Museum in the capital, Sukhum. (Figure 2)

10

“Although it is true that anyone prevented from returning home is an exile, some distinctions
can be made between exiles, refugees, expatriates, and émigrés. Exile originated in the ageold practice of banishment… Refugees on the other hand, are a creation of the twentieth
century state. The word “refugee” has become a political one, suggesting large herds of
innocent and bewildered people requiring urgent international assistance…”5 – Edward Said
“My grandfather was uprooted and I was uprooted” – Amany, a single mother of four in
Abkhazia.
“All of the Syrians have left except for Bashar. He has hasn’t left” –Yanal, an ex- shabīḥa,
Syrian armed supporter of the regime, living in Abkhazia.6
“… At the nearest cemetery…dead Circassians were buried so quickly and carelessly that the
last rain uncovered the graves and hungry dogs ate off the hands and feet of the dead,”7

Deena’s grandfather and great uncles cried when they saw videos of the
mountainous Caucasus. For her generation, these images triggered some
feelings but younger generations just don’t care as much. She has been here for
two years, and now works at the Turkish café. Her son worked as a night guard
before he left for Europe. She and her daughter are now waiting for him to do
lam el shaml (paperwork) for them. “They called us Syrians,” she said after
citing how, having thought she was Turkish at first, people treated her better.
When they knew she was Syrian, the treatment changed. Now she feels the
same way about Syria that her grandfather felt about the Caucasus.

5

Said, Edward, Reflections on Exile and Other Essays, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000): pg
135.
6
For more information about the Shabiha see this article by Yasin al-Haj Saleh:
https://lb.boell.org/en/2014/03/03/syrian-shabiha-and-their-state-statehood-participation
7
The Russian consul in the Turkish province of Trabzon is reported to have described the initial violence
against, and the forced deportations of Circassians in December 1843. Cited in: Richmond, Walter, The
Circassian genocide. (New Brunswick, N.J;London;: Rutgers University Press, 2013).
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Yaūm al ḥūzn: Remembering the Circassian genocide and forced deportation

She held the camera up to her eye, pointed it towards the clock on one of the old
buildings lined up on the street heading to the port, and she clicked for a photograph.
“There’s no future in Abkhazia,” the 15-year-old Lily said, adding “there’s nothing to do.”
She likes photography and might want to study it later, but she doesn’t know yet, the
prospects feel don’t feel encouraging. For now, school in Abkhazia annoys her. People here,
they expect you to be fluent in Russian, she says. “When you don’t understand what they are
saying they’ll just raise their voice or keep repeating the word! I can hear you but I just don’t
know what you’re saying,” she exclaimed. We walked past the Philharmonia, which hosts all
sorts of musical arts shows right in the middle of Sukhum, Abkhazia’s capital, and she told
me about how some of the Syrians did a sharkasi dance here earlier. Last year, Abkhazia had
a commemoration of yaūm al ḥūzn (day of mourning), to remember the Russian Empire’s
forced dispossession of the Circassians in 1864.8 It had been the 150th anniversary of what
some activists have now called out as the Russian Empire’s genocide against the
Circassians.9I invoke the following historicization of the Circassian genocide and/or ethnic
cleansing, as well as other historical moments that I found pertinent in peoples’ narratives,
because “it is the present that determines the past, making the past a mere simulacrum of the
present.”10To reflect on Lily’s own insight and guesses regarding the future, we can also
consider Valentine’s statement, “the future, thanks to the capriciousness of the present, is
uncertain and bleak.”11
8

I use the work sharkas throughout the thesis to refer to Circassians.
Catic, Maja. “Circassians and the politics of genocide recognition.” Europe-Asia Studies 67 (10): 1685.(2015)
10
Daniel, E. Valentine, Charred lullabies: Chapters in an anthropography of violence. (Princeton, N.J:
Princeton University Press: 1996; 2001). Pgs. 107, 108
Please note that I use both the description of genocide and ethnic cleansing because, as the following pages
demonstrate, descriptions of this historic event are contested.
11
Ibid. Please
9

12

The Syrian-Circassians who left Syria for Abkhazia in the last few years of war did so
because they can claim links to Circassian ancestors that the Russian empire had forcibly
dispossessed in the late 19th century. With the background of the 2014 Sochi Olympic in
Russia (and the Circassian mobilization around it) in mind, as well as the idea of the
Circassian genocide and Circassian ‘return’ as one of the bases on which Syrians were able to
migrate to Abkhazia, we can summon Trouillot’s Silencing of the Past. History reveals itself
“through the production of specific narratives,” and the processes and conditions of the
production of such narratives, which are ongoing, are what matter most.12For this reason, for
the sake of what the Circassian genocide has come to symbolize in the collective
imaginations of many, and whilst considering how or when memories are invoked in the
present, a brief contextualization of Abkhazia’s 19th century history is necessary.13The
territory of the modern-day self-proclaimed republic of Abkhazia was, at different historical
moments in the past, part of ancient Rome, Byzantium, and Persia. Later, Arabs, Genoese,
Turks, and Russians had also ruled, or attempted to rule, the area.14 One can easily concur
that the history of this small area is far more complicated than a nationalist narrative that
concentrates on, and takes pride in, alleged characters of “purity” makes it out to be.
By 1810, Abkhazia was absorbed by the Russian Empire, and according to Alexei
Zverev, before then, Abkhazian rulers had been “in nominal or effective vassalage or union
with various (although often separate) Georgian kingdoms.”15 Both those who argue that
Abkhazia had historically been united with Georgia and those who argue that it was
autonomous, do so on the basis of historical grounds. As is often the case when reading
history through the lens of the present, the narrative thus becomes ambiguous. This is

12

Trouillot, Michel-Rolph, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press,
1995) pg. 25
13
Nora, Pierre. “Between memory and history: Les lieux de mémoire.” Representations(26): 7-24 (1989)
14
Zverev, Alexei,“Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus 1988-1994” in Contested Borders in the Caucasus. Ed.
Bruno Coppieters, Vubpress. (1996)
15
Ibid.
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important to bear in mind whilst thinking of the Abkhazian separatist war with Georgia in the
early 90s.16

Historicizing the Genocide:

According to the historian Walter Richmond, Russian imperial expansion drove the
Circassians out of their homes in the North West Caucasus in the late 1800s. The peaks of
mass migration into various parts of the Ottoman Empire, including of course the area of
modern-day Syria, took place in the years 1876, 1880, 1885, and 1901.17The Ottoman
Empire, in negotiations with its Russian counterpart, accepted the Circassian mass
deportations and hoped that the new population would contribute in labor, and increase the
empire’s total agricultural output. Furthermore, in accordance with contemporary rhetoric,
Richmond argues that the Circassians had a reputation for “military efficiency,” that
memories of the Circassian-Mamluk were alive in the Ottoman Empire, and that Muslim
settlements would act as a counter weight to the Christian populations “clamoring for
independence.”18 The negotiations began as early as 1859. Initially, the Russian empire
promised that the deportation process would be gradual, and that no more than fifty thousand
people would be sent off to the Ottoman lands. The two empires finalized the treaty in 1860.
The wealthier Karbadian aristocrats were the first arrivals in 1860 and 1861, but by 1863, the
heightening forced deportations began to “overwhelm” the Ottomans.19 Despite objections
from the Ottomans’ side, the mass deportations continued and “more people were being
forced to the shore and loaded onto boats.”20
16

I briefly elaborate on this war later in chapter two.
Shami, Seteney. “Historical Processes of Identity Formation: Displacement, Settlement, and SelfRepresentations of the Circassians in Jordan.” Iran & the Caucasus, 13(1), 141–159.(2009)
18
Richmond, Walter, The Circassian genocide. (New Brunswick, N.J; London;: Rutgers University Press,
2013).
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
17

14

An estimated 1.2 to 1.5 million set out from the Caucasus to Turkey but only about
800,000 to 1.1 million people eventually arrived and settled in the Ottoman
land.21Expectedly, large numbers of people died, and drowned en route. People were thrown
off the boats for various reasons, especially if they were suspected to have been carrying
contagious diseases.22Such problems did not end upon arrival as Turkish bureaucracy was
unable to “handle” all the settlements and the documents; many Circassians thus also died
due to lack of shelter and food in the aftermath of their trips across the Black Sea to the
Ottoman Empire.
In 1877 Russia declared war with the Ottomans. Richmond writes, adding that
Russian fighters often incited villages with mixed populations by disarming Muslims and
arming their counterparts, provoking them to “slaughter their neighbors.”23 Many Circassian
cavalry squadrons took part in that war, and in 1877, approximately one thousand Circassians
made their way to Gudauta, Abkhazia and provided the local population with arms. Later, the
Ottoman loss of the Balkans forced fifty thousand Circassians to head off once again, this
time to what is now modern-day Syria. In the Syrian province, Circassians were settled in the
Golan Heights.
Many had also moved to the Balqa region in Jordan and the Tiberas region in
Palestine. Settlement processes were unorganized as the only branch of the Ottoman
Empire’s Immigration Bureau was in Aleppo, and had been as described as “overwhelmed”
by the amount of migrants. Senteny Shami writes that, at best, this bureau provided people
with transportation, located and settled them on state lands, and left them afterwards to fend
for themselves. She tells readers: “While the long process of displacement and resettlement

21

Shami, Seteney. “Historical Processes of Identity Formation: Displacement, Settlement, and SelfRepresentations of the Circassians in Jordan.” Iran & the Caucasus, 13(1), 141–159.(2009)
22
Ibid
23
Ibid
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scattered families, kin-groups and co-villagers, it also firmed the definition of the identity of
the Circassians as the ‘immigrant migrant people.’”24
Controversy stirred and heightened in the moment of the2014 Sochi Olympics in
Russia, which, as brought up by Lily, also marked 150 years since the Russian ethnic
cleansing of the Circassians.25The Sochi Olympics was an instant to bring up the massacres
and the myth-making behind the Russian state. It was a chance to bring up the mass killings
and forced deportations of the Russian Empire against the Circassians which, in the late
1980s and early 1990s, Circassians and activists in the Russian republics and in the diaspora
began to describe as a genocide. The counter-memories of historically suppressed groups
manifested themselves against official Soviet history, and spoke out in grievances of Tsarist
imperialism as well as of brutal Stalinist polices during the Soviet-era.26 Theoretically
inspired by Pierre Nora, the scholar Lars Funch Hansen argues that the Circassian diaspora,
in Russia and abroad, mobilized and memoralized around the 2014 Winter Olympic in Sochi.
In Chapter two of this thesis, I discuss the details of how Syrians in Abkhazia, who with an
Abkhazian passport should be able to freely move between the Abkhazia-Sochi borders, were
not allowed into Sochi during the Winter Olympics.27
Images of displaced resettlement:

In her studies of Circassians in Jordan, Shami argues that the key images of being
displaced, settlers, and Muslims enabled the Circassians to both maintain a sense of
difference, and to integrate within the broader Jordanian society. The key images that
Circassians used to describe themselves evoked and drew upon this history of displacement,
24

Shami, Seteney. “Historical Processes of Identity Formation: Displacement, Settlement, and SelfRepresentations of the Circassians in Jordan.” Iran & the Caucasus, 13(1), 141–159.(2009)
25
Persson, Emil, Bo Petersson. “Political mythmaking and the 2014 winter olympics in Sochi: Olympism and
the Russian great power myth.” East European Politics 30 (2): 192 (2014)
26
Catic, Maja. “Circassians and the politics of genocide recognition.” Europe-Asia Studies 67 (10): 1685. (2015)
27
Lars Funch Hansen, “Sochi as a site of long distance Circassian memoralisation,” in The Sochi Predicament:
Contexts, Characteristics and Challenges of the Olympic Winter Games in 2014 ed. Bo Petersson and Karina
Vamling Cambridge Scholars Publishing.2013Pg. 13
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settlement, and resettlement.28As for the Circassians in Syria, these images of dispossession
are heightened since, because had been concentrated in villages in the Golan Heights, they
had even further experience being forced out of the villages after Israeli occupations in 1967,
and later in 1973. El- Qeneitra, a province in the Golan, came up constantly whenever
conversations would float back to memories of Syria. All such instances and stories, topped
with the most recent ones, made shaa’b muhajar which roughly translates into “an immigrant
people” or a “displaced people.”29
According to the older Syrian men who watch the Black Sea with their coffee in hand
almost every morning, there were approximately fifteen sharkas villages in the Golan. These
villages made it easier for the sharkas to stick together so that up until one hundred years
ago, they spoke each other’s languages; they married from each other, rarely marrying Arabs,
and they maintained traditions, the Syrian men in Abkhazia told me. After leaving for
Damascus, the [only parts left of] Golan became a place just for the summers, and gradually
traditions became more difficult to keep together, the men said.30
Circassians, like any other group of people meshed together under a label, are not
homogenous. Therefore the situation for Circassians in Jordan is very different than that of
the Circassians in Syria, as I am sure it is different for Ciracssians elsewhere in the world.
Nonetheless, Shami’s argument does serve as important contextual information, not because
of the idea of “identity” per se, but because a lot of contemporary narratives on war and wartime migration related back to these stories about the Circassians’ mass deportations. For this
project, ideas of displacement that imply a “natural” placement in the world are made more
complicated by the idea that the Syrian-Circassians journeying to Abkhazia and being

28

Shami, Seteney. “Historical Processes of Identity Formation: Displacement, Settlement, and SelfRepresentations of the Circassians in Jordan.” Iran & the Caucasus, 13(1), 141–159. (2009)
29
For an account of forced migration out of the Golan: “Syria: Forty years on, people displaced from the Golan
remain in waiting,” Norwegian Refugee Council: (Oct. 2007)http://www.internaldisplacement.org/assets/library/Middle-East/Syria/pdf/Syria-October-2007.pdf
30
http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Middle-East/Syria/pdf/Syria-October-2007.pdf
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emplaced “back” to where they are originally from. Another layer of complication is added
when one considers the fact that approximately 200,000 ethnic Georgians had to leave their
own homes in Abkhazia after the 1992 war.31

The figure of the “Syrian Refugee”:

The Danish Refugee Council began working with the Syrians sometime after
they first arrived “even though we are not refugees we are repatriates,” Hanan
who now works with the DRC told me. She described the case is unique. At a
conference in Turkey, people were confused when the DRC described how
different the case is for Syrians in Abkhazia, Hanan continued to explain The
DRC mostly works with the Mingrelians and Georgian IDPs (internally
displaced peoples) on the borders with Georgia, but since Syrians have come
the DRC has been helping them out a bit too.

~~~
May said remembers that she could still see her father’s old car on the other
side of a fence, now it is on the Israeli occupied side of the Golan, when the
family would visit in the summers. Her father used to have land in the Golan
and he used to narrate and tell them his memories there whenever they
vacationed in the non-occupied parts of the mountains region. Now they are all
broken up and apart, May said. And now, if you see a nice view or sight it will
have no taste and if you eat something nice, you will not enjoy it because you
will find yourself constantly carrying burden, she said describing her condition.

~~~
Syrians have “nazahu, safaru, hajaru, harabu (fled, travelled, migrated,
escaped)… all of these descriptions [apply],” Nart said. I was walking with
Nart and Marah, both of whom I had just met. Even though Marah had been in
Abkhazia for three years and Nart had been there for six month, the two had
also just met that day. We walked on the promenade by the Black Sea, past the
Turkish cafes, the restaurants that sell Abkhazian food, and past the
Philharmonia. We sat on a bench in front of the sea, which was not so clearly
in sight since it was nighttime. As though the sound of the waves had reminded
him, Nart began to speak of how Syrians are dying in the waters of the
Mediterranean now. It is so similar to what happened to the sharkas at the end
of the 18th century, he said.
Marah told us about what her (soon-to-be) fiancé saw on the boat when he was
making his way to Italy; the smugglers, the hunger, the crowdedness, and even
the jokes.

~~~

31

Thomas De Waal."Abkhaz, Circassians, Georgians and Historical Justice,” Carnegie Endowment.
(2011)http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/05/18/abkhaz-circassians-georgians-and-historical-justice
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“In any country in Europe we would be considered refugees, but here that is not [the case].”
– Liza Abaza, a Circassian-Syrian woman.
~~~
Huda said she thinks that some of the apartments that have been rented for
Syrians used to belong to Georgians before the war. She had seen Georgian
letters and phrases embedded into the desk at a friend’s house, she said.

~~~
“Waves” of refugees are causing what the media often calls Europe’s worst refugee
problem since the World War; never mind the fact that war-time migration is constantly put
into a Eurocentric –Western-centric– framing.32 In the Arab world, borders are increasingly
closing up, no visas, no residency, and no welcomes. Hungary proceeds to build longer and
higher fences and walls, as though caging the nation from an “invasion” of refugees.
33

“Nation-states, rich and poor, exhibit a passion for wall building,” and these walls,

sometimes walls within walls, are not so much about defense as they target the “non-state”
actors and subjects, and are theatrically, ritualistically spoken of and acted around.34 As
walling continues, sovereignty wanes and states persist as non-state actors, Wendy Brown
argues.35Interestingly enough, these walls codify the challenges that they allege to be
responding to, and state officials forget that the subjects they lock out are actually produced
within these walls.36
In order to better comprehend the scope of the so-called “refugee problem,” one also
needs to genealogically trace back the context in which this category emerged and ask under
what circumstances and for what purposes this category became useful. In other words, it is
worth investigating some of the “myriad events through which- thanks to which, against
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which,” this category came to be.37 Malkki argues that while people who have had to flee
war, natural disaster, famine, and other phenomena have existed before this period, it was
after the Second World War in Europe that the key techniques through which states could
manage the mass displacements of people emerged. Classifying “refugees” was a foundation
for such techniques.38 Later, such techniques would become globalized and standardized. 39
A historical review of when the term came into use reveals that during World War II,
civilians and displaced people caught in-between fighting had been considered a military
“combat” problem rather than a humanitarian one. In 1944, it was the allied military that
improvised policy plans on how to deal with the “refugee problem.”40 It was in this
militarized context that the institutionalized domain of refugee resettlement, refugee camp
administration, and a legal domain of refugee law emerged. After signing the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, in 1948, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
was established in 1951. Refugee rights were thus incorporated into the upcoming human
rights discourse, and the refugee "problem" shifted publically from a military issue to a
humanitarian one. Refugee law thus also came to be seen as inseparable from human rights.
According to the UNHCR, the legal definition of a refugee is said to correspond to "a
social reality" and was thus identified as:
A person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a wellfounded fear or being persecuted because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 41
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There are however two main conditions, "(1) refugee status is determined exclusively
by events arising out of the relations between a state and persons or categories of persons
who are either nationals of that state or resident in its territory;(2) Such persons or categories
of persons must be outside the territory of the state in question."42 It should thus be noted that
internally displaced peoples do not fit into the UNHCR definition of what constitutes a
refugee. Also, at this point in time, the legal refugee regime emerged in a Eurocentric;
framing, Maliki notes, UN organizations have played a decisive role and instrumental role in
consolidating “the international refugee system.”43 It was along with the rise of the “refugee
camp” that refugees more easily became an object of knowledge and study; this includes
primarily quantitative study. As the UNHCR, and other international aid agencies produce
maps, statistics, and assessments that scholars such as Jennifer Hyndman criticize in that the
productions occur without reference to the historical configurations of power that precede
them.44 At the same time, refugee camps, cartography, counting and recording become
enactments of the controversial power relations that exist between refugees and humanitarian
aid agencies. In other words, thousands of refugees become dependents on such
humanitarian agencies as the agencies are put to work and sustained (as institutions) through
the increasing numbers of refugees.45Within such processes of knowledge production, the
"refugee" also became a quantifiable figure; which agencies and states constantly updating
their figures for the latest statistics on the exact number of refugees.46
One of the processes that facilitated "the refugee" eventually becoming a knowable,
nameable, social scientific category of knowledge and expertise emerged along with and
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around the "refugee camp.” This included camp administrators, doctors, NGO and
international agency workers, journalists, photographers, state bureaucrats, and refugees
themselves. Since refugees had initially been a military responsibility, refugee camps were
made to resemble military camps. Germany, which had a large number of refugees after
World War two, modeled its refugee camps after work and concentration camps and
officially named them "Assembly Centres."47 By the end of World War two, the refugee
camp became the standardized unit and technology of power in the management and control
of the mass displacement of people, as Malkki puts it. The camp controlled movement,
spatial concentration, the ordering of the people withheld within its premises. It also
facilitated the bureaucratic and administrative processes that provided for easier surveillance
and legal control of people. It was thought that, if they had not been handled, refugees would
enter the black-market and become looters and thieves. The refugee camp thus ensured law
enforcement and public discipline. It also became part and parcel of the UN model of the
“three durable solutions: Repatriation, Integration, and Resettlement,” of refugees while there
has been a general lack of critical questioning of the refugee camp as an apparatus for the
control of space and movement.48
For many scholars, and particularly for UN officials, the most frequently asked
questions regarding “refugees” have been concerned with scope, definition, and causality
while others addressed the nature of the “refugee problem” and possible solutions.49 Most
early scholarship on refugees concerns the burden they pose for host states, on the economy,
on national identity and security.
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Forced Migration and the “Refugee” in the Middle East:

It was alongside the wave of decolonization taking place in the 1960s that the refugee
became a "third world problem," as this decade witnessed peaks in the numbers of refugees.
International organizations represented the so-called“third world”, including the Middle East,
as a "refugee producer" or as having been an immense source of refugees.50 These
representations made absent the point that while the overwhelming majority of refugees were
produced in the “third world,” the causes of their displacement and plight were kept alive and
preserved by the world's superpowers. In the Middle East, Palestinian and Iraqi refugees are
examples of such a phenomenon.51
The Palestinian refugee problem especially has been compartmentalized by the UN
when UNRWA was created and once again when the “special agency” for Palestinians, the
UNCCP was created. Even the levels of development aid and refugee policies are usually
defined by the domestic interests of “host states,” and, ironically, international agencies are
largely funded by the very same superpowers that are purported to have non-political goals. I
mention here Palestinian refugees, because in more than one sense I see that their
experiences- or the fact that they were somehow left to their fleeing- somehow paved the way
in which this forced fleeting would take place concurrently in the region.52
Early UN representations of Middle East refugees were also often orientalist; much as
many refugee media representations, and official political discourses, today are also quite
50
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racist and orientalist. In a book entitled “The Refugee Problem in the Middle East,” longtime
UN reporter wrote shortly after the 1948 Nakba wrote of the social and economic problems
“posed by Palestinian refugees,” and described the menace they would cause to the Israeli
economy if they were to return. They are “unskilled, illiterate” people, he says adding that
“the Arabs want to return to their homes,” because they have an immense hatred towards
Israel.53In this book, he also claims that the Arabs are just “not cooperating” with
international charity citing specifically the United Nations Conciliation Commission for
Palestine.54
We have also seen instances of purely racist responses to what has been termed the
“refugee crisis,” more often irritatingly coined the “European refugee crisis.” Didier Fassin,
writing in the early 2000s, analyzed France’s moral economy of compassion and repression
towards refugees- a term which in this case indexed their residential situation rather than a
legal status that the state was not eager to grant them. The state’s treatment of refugees
oscillated between “sentiments of sympathy” on the one hand, and concern for order on the
other.55 It maneuvered between “a politics of pity and policies of control.”56European states
thus manage to make it so that “in societies justly famed for their hospitality and warmth, we
encounter the pettiest form of bureaucratic indifference to human needs and suffering.”57
Refugees also become racialized. Paul Gilroy’s articulation of the function of the
notions of race and nationality in modern nation-state formations would aid an analysis of
generally racialized policies towards refugees. Gilroy argues that modernity, which refers to
the confluence of capitalism, the emergence of modern governments, and the appearance of
the nation- state, saw a rise in the development of concepts such as territorial sovereignty,
53
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cultural, and communicative apparatuses, and a new sense of the relationship between place
and community that we now call “identity.”58 National and racial formations have resulted in
“embattled camps” based on hierarchal and regimented qualities and privileges. In many
ways we can see the continuum of this orientalist rhetoric in, as one example, the German
state’s “guides for refugees,” aimed at teaching refugees not to abuse children, not to practice
sexual harassment, and to respect homosexuality among other things.59 The guide is based on
assumptions that see “refugees” (a product of the “third-word”) as stupid, backward,
intolerant people that need to be enlightened by the moralities of the German state.60
Refusing the category:
Huda said she doesn’t want to go to Germany, to save up four thousand
dollars just to give the money to some smuggler in the end. Then they would
have to start over, learn a new language, and do everything again from the
start. “Why?” she asks, “we’ve already been through that.”

~~~
Nour wishes she could go to Germany. She hates Abkhazia, she says. She’s not
even Abakhzian, she’s Circassian, she tells me jokingly. Omar, her husband, is
always cursing Bashar for being the reason behind all of this. She jokes and
tells me how Omar goes out to the balcony and prays: “God curse you
Bashar…may you come to Abkhazia and not have a ticket back out.”
Over breakfast, everyone was talking about who’s going to Germany. Merkel
has opened the door for refugees and Germany wants people and laboring
hands. There’s news that Merkel will be sending large ships to Turkey. Nour
joked that all of Syria will be waiting for those ships, how are people going to
fit? She continued joking about how she’s going to Turkey to wait for those
ships on Turkey’s shores.

~~~
Whilst thinking of the construction of the category of the refugee, it is necessary to
also consider the now emerging category of “the Syrian refugee.” In many instances, it is
almost as if the two are always one and the same; one cannot be Syrian without being a
refugee. A sort of synonymy has been created between the two labels. Here, I argue that the
“refugee” label should not automatically be plastered upon anyone who carries Syrian
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nationality, as has been the tendency more recently. This is for various reasons; primarily
because people themselves often reject the institutionalized category, because of the baggage
it carries in terms of negative representations of helplessness, pity, and non-agency, and
because often people do not need the link to the United Nations that comes along with
carrying the label of a “refugee.” Finally, I hope this project pays tribute to the dynamism of
this “Syrian refugee crisis” in the sense that it can highlight how Syrians are themselves a
dynamic people. There are Syrian-Armenians who went to Armenia, there are Syrian Kurds
that went to Iraqi Kurdistan, and as this project shows, Syrian-Circassians that went to
Abkhazia. It is not all about Europe, especially when considering how expensive the trip is
for most people, as Heba mentioned in the ethnographic piece I added above.
We can take Maryam’s reaction to the idea of traveling to Germany as an example.
One afternoon, I asked Maryam about her sister- in-law Dina, who had not been showing up
for the Russian classes. Dina had been trying to go to Turkey, so that she can then travel- by
sea- to Europe with her son, Maryam said. I could hear the disapproving tone in her voice.
“What’s wrong? Do you think you might go to Germany too?” I asked her. She responded
with a clear-cut“no.”Luju’ la’ (asylum, no) she said adding that she was not ready to give up
the prospect of ever seeing Syria again. Applying for luju’- asylum or refugee status-often
means sacrificing any chance of going back to (regime-controlled) Syria until the fall of the
regime. Thus Dina and Maryam have different views on moving to Germany, and Sara and
Heba also have different views and if anything all of these thoughts about moving to
Germany or not, just go further in showing how this category is negotiated and thought
through (socially, economically, and politically),and is not a given.
Furthermore, humanitarian organizations themselves can deny the institutionalized
refugee status to people, in other words, not recognize them as refugees. For example
“internally displaced peoples,” even if they are extremely close to the borders of another
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state, are not granted refugee status. Palestinian-Syrians, as mentioned above, are not granted
refugee status. With application to those Iraqis displaced after the 2003 U.S. occupation of
Iraq, Julie Peteet tackles what she calls, “the continued decay of twentieth-century concepts
of who is a refugee.”61She argues that the non-recognition if many of the Iraqis in 2003 as
refugees had extreme implications of the displaced populations. This non-recognition, she
says, diminished their rights to asylum, protection, and assistance.62 In this sense, the
“refugee” label, while not problematic per se, has implications and myriad forces behind how
the category is constructed deserve some scrutiny.
While there has been a great deal of literature written on the fact that refugees have
agency and while this should now be taken as a given, the point does not seem to have
become a hegemonic one, yet. The category of “refugee” seems to eat people up as they are
recast in “singularly reductionist molds.”63Lubkemann, like Malkki and many others, points
out that the word “refugee” is used to identify people in a way that misses that they are also
simultaneously “brothers, workers, neighbors, and elders…” In much the same way,
“combatants” are seen as a categorical sum whose only role is to perpetuate violence and
“victims” are those whose only role is to suffer violence. I also really appreciate his use of
the term wartime migrant, because it is a descriptive term that does not carry the same
baggage of the term “refugee.”While, the term “refugee” is not always a bad one per se, and
while it is the most popularly used term to describe millions of people at the moment, it is
also a term that many of those that I have worked with did not identify. In fact, many even
thought it offensive.64
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In another similar incident, Liza Abaza, one of the Syrian women in Abkhazia who is
quoted above, said that living in Abkhazia was not so tremendously bad since, “in any
country in Europe would be considered refugees, but here no.” Again, there is an assumption
here about “refugee treatment.” Of course this sentence was followed up by a long list of the
obstacles, difficulties, and discrimination that the Syrians living in Abkhazia have faced, but
it is still very telling. In much the same way that Liisa Malkki had written that we all now
have some ideas, or pictures in our head of what a refugee is supposed to look like (usually
images of women and children next to tents may come to mind), we now also have an idea of
what “refugee treatment,” is.65
As Lubkemann reminds us, the wartime migrant, or the “refugee” is often cast as a
“paradigmatic non-agent produced by violence.”66 The “refugee” is stripped of concern for
“higher-order needs” and is also stripped of a past. An obsession with violence (by
“viewers”) renders that person’s past meaningless, and this person’s present and future are
thereby also rendered ineffective. Refugees are rendered as “universally undifferentiated
actors whose culturally differentiated identities of interests no longer inform their action” and
this type of rhetoric and representation compliments well the hegemonic international
humanitarian discourse. People's’ behavior is thought to be over-determined by external
larger forces alone.67
As much as this a category that people negotiate, this is also a category that is
imposed on people, putting aside the fact that it may be utilized and negotiated. Emma
Haddad follows up from Malkki’s arguing by adding that “the refugee” is an inevitable
byproduct and consequence of the modern nation-state system. There is a “fundamental and
mutually constitutive link” between the concept of “the refugee” and contemporary
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international society.68Furthermore, the tendency of fields like refugee studies to see the
existence of refugee as a sign of something having gone wrong with the international system
is problematic. The refugee is often portrayed as having been produced or created by a
system of illiberal governance in contrast to the “normal” “rooted citizen of liberal
governance. As Haddad argues it, it is the existence of modern political borders that ensures
the re-creation of refugees. The construct of the refugee remains as long as the construct of
the modern nation-state remains.
On “refugee” stories:

In his book, The Politics of Storytelling: Violence, Transgression and Intersubjectivity,
Jackson dedicates a chapter to refugee stories and refugee lives. As Jackson narrates it, “the
refugee embodies the intransitive.” As a “transient… he or she belongs to nowhere –
constituting at once a problem for administrative order and for the discourse of social science,
grounded as it is in the discursive habits of a sedentary culture that favors substantive,
intransitive, bounded notions of identity and meaning.”69 The “refugee experience” is “often
characterized by fleetingness, uncertainty, and flux.”70 Flight seems to be an experience of
“moving through a totally destabilized and devastated world.” Thomas Nail may be echoing a
corresponding idea when he says that while not all migrants are “alike in their movement,”
all migrants, on the migratory spectrum of the two poles of “inconvenience” and
“incapacitation,” in the process of migration itself share “an insecurity of some kind and
duration.”71 I agree, although still stress that scholars and other observers need to be more
reflective and cautious about the extent to which they can blob and mush people together
with certain traits (refugees are this, refugees are that).
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In a section on flight and narrativity, Jackson cites that many writers have noted the
most attesting thing about “refugee stories” and more generally the stories of people in crisis
“is that life all but ceases to be narratable.” He writes:
“Not only is there a loss of the social context in which stories are told; the very unities
of space, time and character on which narrative coherence depends are broken. For refugees,
life is no longer a journey or narrative the meaning of which is consummated in return, or
even, in time.”72
As the narrator – the refugee- tells the story, there is a sense that he or she is “out of
time” or nowhere, or in other words “refugee stories typically juxtapose nightmarish
collections of flight and nostalgic images of Paradise Lost.”73They are not like the stories we
ordinarily tell,” Jackson writes; they do not carry us to a consoling denouement, they do not
require that one listens and responds, and they do not carry the prospect of closure. 74I
appreciated, learned from, and agreed with most of what Jackson has written on the politics
of storytelling. Yet, although he quotes the most prominent anthropologists in his section on
“refugee stories,” I cannot help but be skeptical. The chapter, whilst theoretically useful,
seems to be painting the “refugees” and “their” storytelling as somehow particularly unique,
particularly fragmented, “out of time,” and not like the stories “we” would ordinarily narrate.
Jackson seems to be perpetuating the idea that the “refugee experience” is a homogenous one.
Jackson quotes Malkkii, but fails to really allow his own descriptions of “refugee stories” to
digest Malkkii’s critiques.75 By giving “refugee stories” specific traits it seems that Jackson
also universalizes the “refugee” into a “special kind” of human being that has traumatized
into telling fragmented stories.76
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Nonetheless, one certainly ought to give Jackson credit for the fact that he does
broaden what he means by “displacement” by explaining that it is not just about migration,
that often displacement is actually about increasing immobilization, or deteriorating
conditions. Maybe “displacement” is not about being re-located from one’s supposed
“natural” place, maybe instead, it is about transforming lifescapes and structural violence. In
this thesis for example, one can look at the Syrian-Circassians as multiply displaced peoples
(and many of whom describe themselves this way) or one can see them as a people who had
been displaced, but have now gone back to their “natural” placement, and more often than not
these two narratives complement each other rather than oppose one another.77
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Introduction
‘Neyalek Serty Abkhazeyeh’: Placement and Reflections78

This is a photo of a booklet entitled “Abaza” in Russian letters, two Abkhazians gave my father and I
this booklet during a discussion we were having about the “Abazas.” A Syrian man was with us and
helped with translation. (Figure 3)

“In Abkhazia, the easy is impossible and the impossible is easy,” –An Abkhazian government
official to my father.
“Is this a real place? I asked?
No more, no less, than any other. She smiled.”79

Yesterday after the Russian class the group stood outside the school for a few
minutes before each one of us parted ways with the rest. May talked about
how she would have never imagined ever coming to Abkhazia… then she said
something very cute about how maybe God put us in this situation so that we
can meet and get to know each other.
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Abkhacia, Afkhasia, Afghanistan, Uzbekhazia: these are some of the places where my
friends and family thought I was over the summer. All were used to reference and to ask
about, Abkhazia, a small self-proclaimed state (aren’t they all anyway?) squeezed between
Russia and Georgia. In the eyes of the United Nations and the European Union, it is still
considered to be a part to the Republic of Georgia, which it had a secessionist war with in
1992.Shortly before my arrival to the field site, I too had hardly ever heard of Abkhazia, or of
its surrounding geographies, let alone imagined that I would end up doing research there. I
delve into and elaborate on the historicity, and into my ethnographic observations of this
mountainous area overlooking the Black Sea throughout the rest of this thesis. Yet, I must
first explain my connection to the place, which is itself a very peculiar one since it has added
another layer to the ethnography and to the larger argument. I also believe this connection
has made the first steps of my fieldwork a bit easier, and was one of the reasons many of the
participants in this project trusted and befriended me quickly.
The connection I have to the field begins with my last name. For me, my last name
has never meant anything more than the fact that I was usually the first on the attendance
sheets in class. Even in Egypt, I was never very engaged or had much connection to my
larger, or extended family. Once in the field, I was confronted with the fact that my last name
was also the name of a language, an ethnic group of people, and a television channel called
“Abaza TV” in Abkhazia. During such seemingly unusual moments of encountering my last
name as a nationality, I questioned whether I may have been tripping on acid, or high on
shrooms. In about three weeks, I received an Abkhazian citizenship on the basis of my last
name. Over the past three years, Abkhazia also granted a few hundred Syrian nationals
descendants of Circassians who fled from the North Caucasus approximately, and whose
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plight I historicized in the preface. According to official rhetoric they are called “repatriates”
or “returnees.”80
Seeing what was to me only a last name used in practice and in conversation as a
“nationality,” in the same ways any other taken-for-granted national category, like
“Egyptian” or “Syrian” would be used, brought to life Benedict Anderson’s conceptions of
“imagined communities.”81 Looking at how “Abaza” became a category shed light on how
other seemingly more “real” categories, and the nationalisms that often accompany them, are
not timeless nor are they “natural.” Each category has a traceable genealogy, and strong,
lived social, political, and economic implications in determining peoples’ life chances. By
looking at the case of the war-time migrants that have journeyed from Syria to Abkhazia, an
unrecognized state where the struggle for separatism from Georgia is still felt, this thesis
tackles the idea that statehood is imagined and performed through war-making and nationbuilding practices.82 Unrecognized states like Abkhazia strive towards state-hood and
recognition, navigating through the dominant modern state-system but also rendering the
world order of states as a “collective illusion,” to borrow the phrase of Begoña Aretxaga.83
Naroda Abaza: The Abaza People:
Sitting by the window on a sunny afternoon, in Rahma’s apartment, we drank coffee,
which everyone tells me is incomparable to the coffee bel sham (in Syria), which better on so
many levels, “but we’ve gotten used to [the bad tasting coffee].” Dina and I start talking
about the sharkas and the Abazāt; as was usually the case, she asked me about Egypt and I
did not know. The “Abazas” in Egypt ended up there during Mamluk era, she tells me, they
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were taken from their homes in the mountains to become Mamluks, (ruling slaves) and join
Ottoman janissaries because they were “mountain men.”84 They made good “warriors” and
“soldiers.” Baybars is one example, she tells me and I am reminded of Arabic high school
texts.85 This conversation occurred repeatedly, with all types of people. Abu Mahmoud, a
Syrian ma I met in Egypt and one of the first people to tell me about a link between my last
name,Abaza and a country called Abkhazia, also narrated to me the richness of a Circassian
history over a viber phone call when he was finally in Sweden and I was in Abkhazia.
“The man who built the Alexandria library…?” an elderly Jordanian man who had
come over the summer asked me as I sat with him and his family in the newly opened Syrian
café. “Is a sharkasi…?” I guessed in a half-question, half-statement. “Of course,” he would
say before continuing to ask me about more sharkas and Abazas whom I did not know, in
large part also because of my ignorance on Egyptian historical figures. “I’ll get upset,” he
joked whenever my face went blank with obvious lack of knowledge; I would smile and he
would continue. The Abazāt in Egypt were different because they ended up there way before
those who forcibly migrated to Syria, Jordan, Turkey and Palestine after the Russian
Empire’s ethnic cleansing of Circassians in the Caucasus. They have forgotten their origins
unlike other Circassians who have maintained their traditions, people reasoned. In Jordan
and in Syria, as those were the two countries whose Circassians I became most familiar with,
had Circassian associations, gatherings, and festivities as well as language classes. Madame
Nariman told me when she was in Egypt (way back when my thesis proposal had nothing to
do with Abkhazia) that she missed Thursday nights in el sham, when she would take her
children to the local Circassian association. Even Abu Mahmoud would always ask me why
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there’s no association connecting the “Abazas” and I never understood why he would ask or
what he had meant, until so much later.86
A short article in a 1998 issue of Al-Hayat newspaper about the “Abaza” family in
Egypt reads a bit like a conversation with a proud nationalist. Reading it reminded me of
how much nationalist rhetoric begins to sound increasingly repetitive, almost as though all
nations can become synonyms, and it does not matter which will be filled into the blanks of a
nationalist speech. In this article, the writer briefly goes over the “important” Abaza figures,
the “national” role they played in Egyptian history. In this case, his review was of a list of
men involved in political parties and other state activities.87However, the author also provides
us with a brief overview of the narratives, myths, and stories of the “origins” of the “Abaza
family,” which I list to provide context and background on how this surname is itself
imagined.88
There are those who say that the family is of “Arab origins” and that they are “the
first Arabs to reside in Egypt,” and that they came with Amru Ibn Al-‘As, the author writes.
He quotes Ibrahim Desouky Abaza, a member of the Wafd party saying that the family
remained closely-knit, because “it is marked by races and traditions closer to a tribal
hereditary system.”One book cites Fikri Abaza, a writer, as having said that “the Abazas were
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more like a tribe.”89Another myth narrates that family tradition attributes the name “Abaza”
originated from the marriage of the eighth in their genealogical line to a woman from the
family of Abaza during the reign of the Circassian Mamluks…”90 On the other hand, there
are also those who say that the “Abaza family” is of “Circassian origins,” that go back to
“Angazia” (“Anjazia”), now located in the Republic of Georgia. (It is interesting to note here,
that he also misspelled “Abkhazia”) The article goes on with a brief sentence of the Russian
Empire’s mass deportations of Circassians into the Ottoman Empire and of the perceived
“shared traits” of Arabs and Circassians (generosity, bravery, etc.).
Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society, a book on Mamluk history informs
readers that during the 17th century, “the elites who posed the greatest threat to Ottoman
authority” were Abaza Mehmed Pasha, governor of Erzurum, and Abaza Hasan Pasha,
governor of Aleppo.91Both were “Abkhazian” and had “exploited legends of the Mamluk
sultans as well as tales of other heroes, both historical and fictional,” the author
argues.92Egypt’s regiments and grandee households in the 18th century were made up of
young men that included Mamluks, mercenaries, soldiery, and other members of the palace
that tended to be from a “disparate array of locales,” that included Abkhazia among other
places such as Bosnia, Bulgaria, Circassia, Hungary, and more.93 These young men had to be
socialized (or had to socialize themselves) into their new placements after they were taken
away from these locales.
“The elite of tribal society” during Mohamed Ali’s rule administrators married into the
“sheikhs” of certain provinces, and this was the method through which the Abaza family
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“gained entrance to national Egyptian politics,” another scholar argues.94 In 1812, Mohamed
Ali appointed “one of the most prominent leaders of the Abaza,” as shekh al-mashaīkh of half
of the Sharqeyya province.95 The Abaza family’s grip on Sharqeyya continued as Suleman
Abaza Pasha, became another administrator who descended from the “the family of the shekh
al-balad of al-Sharqiyya province.”96Most of the information I have found about them, in the
margins of Egyptian history books, tend to primarily identify them as the “rural notables of
the Sharqiyya province.”97 The “Abaza family” had a “monopoly of power in Sharqiyya,”
another modern history book that recounts the 1920s in Egypt went on to discuss the Wafd
party, the “Abaza family,” and electoral practices at the time.98 Since then, the Abazīa have
been keen to maintain parliamentary presence, often running in parliamentary elections
through Sharqiyya circles.99 Even this year’s post-Sisi parliament, which consists mostly of
people who maintain they will “back the state” and support it (as opposed to theoretically
overseeing state officials), contains “Abaza” family members who ran in Sharqiyya electoral
circles. Many of the “Abazas” or Abazīa in Egypt thus have an interesting and intimate
relationship with the state that remains outside the scope of this paper, yet is significant to
note as it came up in conversations with Syrians about the Abazāt in Syria who were also
described to close to Bashar, a point which I will briefly bring up in chapter one.
What I seek to do the above invocations of history books and ethnographic narratives is to
display how it is that even family names – with all that they hold of ambiguity - have a
political, social, and economic life in Egypt, in Syria as well as in Eastern Europe.100 The
information and stories above came up time and again whenever the conversation turned to
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me, and it broke barriers that may have existed if I had not had “Abaza” as a last name when
speaking to interlocutors and meeting people.
Methodology and Methods:

We take for granted the conception that the field is something that you can go see,
hear, and feel, and then come back to the desk and put on paper. This ethnographic project is
a “kaleidoscope” of impressions, events, textures, stories and processes.101Simply put, this
project primarily relied on extensive participant observation, and on a few semi-structured
interviews. While I often tried to “structure” interviews, I felt that these types of interviews
were less genuine than casual, but deep, conversations with people. While I had a difficult
time deciding what to keep out and what to keep in, the many things and ideas I experienced,
heard, and saw, they pay testimony to connected seemingly unrelated things truly are. It
sheds light on how ultimately, social phenomena and relations are more complex than they
seem, more complex than we can understand, and more complex than the following thesis
can ever do justice to. By “complex” here, I also mean intertwined and related in layered
ways. In turn, this points to how nothing ever takes place neatly, or can be maintained inside
the clear-cut, distinct “categories.” This is why, this ethnography, by extension, does not
(cannot) claim whole-ness.102 The multi-vocality and partiality of the Abaza history that
exists in fragments, embedded in the margins of history texts is an example of this.
Social science actually makes a mess when it attempts to organize things that are
“complex, diffuse, and messy.”103 When it does this, social science fails to recognize the
world’s heterogeneity and its variation; it fails to recognize how the world can be an
“unformed but generative flux of forces and relations that work to produce certain
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realities.”104 For realities are neither fixed, nor are they definite and a failure to recognize
how certain realities are constructed, highlighted, and identified at the expense of others is
tragic for social science.105
Furthermore, when giving us the “reality” social science methods, rules, and practices
do not just describe what that they seek to understand, but they also produce and mold it in
the process. They are part and parcel of the specific historical processes and contexts through
which everything (and all ideas and interpretations) are constructed. Thus it is not that reality
imposes such rules and methods on us, but it is the other way around and this is why, we need
to think of method in ways that are looser, broader, and more generous.106
The categories that I embody, which are also quite ambiguous, have shaped the dynamics
of my fieldwork and its outcomes. For example, my gender meant that while I did speak to
many men, most of my closest interlocutors were women, whom I had befriended quickly. I
had access to women’s apartments and they had access to mine when I was staying alone.
Many of my afternoons were spent eating and drinking coffee at these women’s houses
before their husbands came back home from work.107 Some Abkhazian men and women had

104

Ibid.
Ibid.
106
Ibid.
107
In a chapter entitled “Studying your own: the complexities of a shared culture,” summarizing her experiences
in the field, SeteneyShami recounts her experience with Circassians in Jordan, and with studying her “own.” 107
She tells readers about her parents’ ethnic pride and her own “vague doubts about whether there were really a
people called Circassians, or if they were something my parents had made up to complicate my life.” 107 Her
initial interviews “turned in sketchy accounts of the history, customs, and ‘general’ superior qualities of
Circassians, as fondly imagined by the informant.” 107I found this aspect of her fieldwork very familiar and
relatable. Her first interviews with Circassians in Jordan yielded s answers that are very similar to the answers
my own initial interviews yielded. When she asked about “interethnic conflict” she heard “the same stories
about a few clashes at the turn of the century, and rosy pictures of the present.” 107Interestingly enough, I had
also heard, from Jordanian Circassians, the same stories about a few clashes over water. After attempting to
make formal interviews, I decided to give up on the idea of traditional interviews and just spend a lot of time
with people. I could ask questions midst this time, in parties, picnics, and walks on the beach. If I was unsure of
whether I could share something, I would ask whether or not I could write it down in my research. Yet this
brought up another problematic dimension to the field work as sometimes it was only up to my own common
sense and ethical compass to decide whether times were appropriate to ask if a certain conversation could go
into my research, and into my writing. Shami also states that spending time in Circassian homes allowed her
more fruitful fieldwork than formal interviews with community leaders in Jordan, many of whom had been high
level politicians and civil servants. It was when she was invited to spend regular afternoons with regular families
that her fieldwork really began to take form, and again, I find this very relatable. I am also sure that if I had
spent my time differently, the outcome of my research would have had different focus points.
105

40

also been very disapproving of the fact that I would be a girl staying alone. Later, I would
frequently get the surprised question of Ty Odna? (You’re alone?) , even from people I had
met for the first time. As disapproving as they had been, people were also kind and often
insisted that I stay with them in their homes instead of in an apartment alone. Syrian friends
also often asked me if I was afraid of staying alone, but would follow up on their own
question by saying that my father knows that I am there and that they will take care of me so
the environment is trusted.
My father was my main gatekeeper in the field; he was the one who introduced me to the
country, to various important sites within it, and to many of the people whom I worked with,
or have helped me. Lots of people already knew me as, or would introduce me to others as,
“Mohamed Abaza’s daughter” (or in Russian dotshka). There were also many people,
primarily men, which I had easier access to when my father was there and could speak to
more easily once he was gone because he had been there and they knew him.
I justified to myself the fact that my parents would not let make my way to the country
alone by telling myself that Lila Abu Lughod’s father had also introduced her to the her field
site, and to the Awlad Ali Bedouins, with whom she had done her fieldwork. In the edited
book Arab Women in the Field, Lila Abu Lughod writes about her experience, stating: “I
suspect few, if any, fathers of anthropologists accompany them to the field to make their
initial contacts.”108(She should have met my parents) She writes that after living with the
Bedouins for some time, she began to understand her father’s insistence that that be the case.
“As an Arab, although by no means a Bedouin, he knew his own culture and society well
enough to know that a young unmarried woman traveling alone on uncertain business was an
anomaly.”109 She goes on: “By accompanying me, my father had shown those with whom I
would by living and those on whose good opinion and generosity my life and work would
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depend that I was a daughter of a good family…”110 While this is clearly not the case most of
the time, and while this implicitly may have imposed a standard on other Arab women
anthropologists, my father’s presence was initially useful in the sense that it gave me a quick
introduction to the field.
Often, upon hearing my Egyptian-accented colloquial Arabic, Syrian and Jordanian
nationals would ask me about koshary, and other Egyptian dishes as well as actors like
Hussien Fahmy, Roshdy Abaza and Egyptian cinema. People often asked about Egyptian
politics, and many were happy to take the opportunity to practice their Egyptian accents with
me (as I sometimes also did with the Syrian accent). Besides this, many of our conversations,
when they were not about the Abazāt in Syria, were about the Abazāt in Egypt.111
On the other hand, most people who were not Syrian thought I was Syrian. “Syrii?
(Syria?), I would get asked in Russian, “Egipet” I would respond. In different instances I
would get asked about where I was from, and the second question would be ẎoĬna tam, da?
(there is war there, no?). Usually at the end of the day, whilst writing field notes, I would turn
on the television to listen, in an attempt to get used to the sounds of the Russian language.
“The refugee crisis,” was a big deal on Russian news as well. There were many debates aired
on TV where people who argued that the Syrian refugees would bring ISIS into Europe. In
Russia, a woman on the bus asked me, in English if I was going to “live in Russia forever,”
following up with “there is war in your country,” I told her I was going home the same
night.She also thought I was Syrian. Upon hearing I was Egyptian, Russian tourists would
mention having gone to Sharm El-Sheikh, others would remark that this is “interesting,” and
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I loved it when people continued to talking even though they knew that I did not understand
the language.112
Narratives and Stories:

This thesis depends on the narratives of many people that I have met and sat with, but
it is in and of itself, ultimately my own narrative, my own understanding and retelling of
some of the stories I have seen and heard. Abkhazia is small, and the amount of Syrians who
have moved there are small compared to other spaces in the world. If we are to heed to the
often dehumanizing way that their movement is recorded, analyzed, and spoken of (as
‘numbers’), then what makes Syrian war-time migration to Abkhazia important? Well, these
people’s stories, alongside those of the other residents of Abkhazia, are important and
fascinating, and are triggers for reflection on the world we inhabit. In a very similar sense to
that which Jackson notes when he says that the landscape in aboriginal Australia is “storied”
the mountainous landscapes of the Caucasus are also filled with stories, and stories of stories.
At one point, “it was said that more than seventy different languages could be heard in the
market at Dioscurias, the Greek colony on the site of Sukhum in modern Abkhazia.113People
carry along with them different backgrounds; coming from Greece, Georgia, Circassian
cities, Russia, Jordan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Turkey Syria, Armenia, and more. I know that
there are an endless amount of stories behind the drops that I hope to bring through in this
thesis, as Michael Jackson rightly reminds us, “for every story that sees the light of day,
untold others remain in the shadows, censored of suppressed.”114
Stories breach, cross, and blur the boundaries that impose themselves on the political
and ethical spaces of our daily lives and they extend themselves to political domains because
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they mix and smear public and private realms.115To create, organize, and narrate a story out
of a collage of events, is to actively rework them, “both in dialogue with others and within
one’s own imagination.”116 Narrative is expressive but also (re)productive in the sense
storytelling is never just an act of creating personal and social meanings; it is a strategy for
sustaining a sense of agency, often in the face of disempowering circumstances.117As readers
will see, throughout this thesis I interrupt the reader frequently with the ethnographic material
added in short bits and pieces in between the rest of the text.118 Sometimes I provide my
analyses but sometimes I want to the readers to interpret as they see fit, and as they may
understand, so that in the spirit of Benjamin’s advice, the narrative can achieve “an amplitude
that information lacks.”119
In addition, this project integrates a visual component; both as a field method and as a
constituent of the final written thesis. My visual method is focused on still-photography, or
documentary-style photography rather than film. In his book, Visual Methods in Social
Research, Marcus Banks argues that visual methods are an “actively collaborative project”
between image maker and image subjects.120 The social researcher, he writes, should make
sure people understand what he/she is doing and why. Banks references Victor Caldora, a
photographer who accompanied his anthropologist wife on her research. Caldora set up three
main premises for his images: first, that the photographic images are “event-specific
representations,” meaning that images are not for use in generalizing claims, second, meaning
in images is dependent on context, and third, that the production of the photographic image is
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a social event which should involve communication and mutual understanding between the
subject and the maker of the image.121
In her own research on refugees, Malkki briefly goes through the photographic visual
representations of refugees and argues that the tendency to “universalize” the refugee as a
“special kind” of person is as apparent in visual representations as it is in textual
representations. The next chapter elaborates on this idea that, because photographic
representations of refugees are abundant, most people have certain senses of what a refugee
“is supposed to look like.”As Malkki puts it, refugees thus tend to be “captured by the
journalist’s camera as a singularly expressive emissary of horror and powerlessness.”122In
addition, refugees are often portrayed as predominantly women and children. Malkki
criticizes these representations claiming that they play into the discursive constitutions “of
the refugee as bare life.” These universalizing/standardizing representations thus ignore the
agency that refugees hold by complementing international aid agencies that represent
refugees as helpless, vulnerable, and weak.
A Multi-Sited Field of Multiple Realities:

My ethnography and fieldwork focus on Abkhazia, but I still consider my field a
multi-sited one. This is for a variety of reasons, including first the fact that the field, and the
specific historical moment in which I now live (Egypt) has affected my readings of various
events. Certain interpretations may have been different had the circumstances been different.
For example, the fact that I was unable to travel to the site I had initially intended to go to
became, in the end, part and parcel of the fieldwork for this project. 123 The way events,
spaces, and temporalities mesh into each other constantly in everyday narrative and action,
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means that anthropological senses open to multiple sites of observation and participation
makes one better equipped to “cross-cut dichotomies such as the ‘local’ and the ‘global,’ the
‘lifeworld’ and the ‘system.’”124
The second reason pertains to the group of people that I am working with; scholars argue
that diasporas are by definition multi-sited in their stories and experiences. Ordinarily, this
would make the research design based on a transnational methodology, which is generally
useful when conducting fieldwork with diasporic or migrant communities. For example,
Shami’s research on Jordanian and Turkish Circassians, who went “back” to the “homeland,
depended on a transnational theoretical framework, and literature on “identity” while mine
does not. A transnational framework can help in the process of rethinking how peoples’ lives
often “cut across national boundaries,” especially with diasporic groups “whose networks,
activities, and patterns of life encompass both their host and home societies.”125I prefer here
to think of my research as “trans-statal” instead of transnational, to borrow from Katherine
Verdery’s ideas.126 The trans-statal cuts across state boundaries. Furthermore, while the
ethnographic stories I repeat to the reader here cut across these personal, social, political, and
imagined boundaries, so too do the sites of power that cooperate across the very boundaries
that they force people to abide by.
In its most general description, this project directly and indirectly touches upon (and is
effected by) a capitalist neoliberal world and the problematics of a modern nation-state
system with its borders, surveillance, control, disciplining, and the structural violence that it
continues to perpetuate. It is about years of war-making in regions one may not automatically
think to link to each other, about the uprisings in both Egypt and Syria; it is about the link
between various sites of power (Russia, Georgia, Egypt, Syria, Turkey, etc.). Finally, just as
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much as I want it to be about the stories that have been recounted to me by all of the people I
have had the privilege to meet during fieldwork it is also a product of what my senses and my
memory filtered as important. In the following pages, I try to balance between including
myself and between not taking too much of the writing space that I initially allocated to the
people I have met as well as the notions and concepts that I intended to write about.
Nonetheless, for as much as our work seeks to describe, analyze, document, and criticize was
we see as the manifesting realities out-there, it is also about the depictions of those realities
within us; it is about those realities “in-here.”127
Challenging projects of homogeneity:
I found myself stuck for words when, in a visit to Liza Abaza’s house, she asked me
what exactly my thesis was about. It was still so much during the early stages of fieldwork
that I had still been quite confused about what I was doing. Sawsan helped me out and stated
that the research was sort of about “about how we are coming to this place, our homeland, but
it is not our country”. I liked the phrase, but not for the exact reasons Sawsan stated. I liked it
because invites to ask what is really “our country”? It invites us to put forth questions about
the depth and implications of what is now known as a Syrian civil war and refugee crisis.
Initially I did not understand why Circassian Syrians differentiated themselves from
Arabs. They would describe themselves as Syrian; Syria is also their watān, or nation. Yet,
“we are not like the Arabs.” Later on, I also learned there was another word that people used
to describe “Arabs”: bzamo’.128 People often also spent time explaining to me the differences
in terms of habits and traditions between the sharkasand the bzamo’; which was interesting
seeing as they often also spent a lot of time explaining to me other sets of differences
between the Syrians and the Abkhaz. Yet, after thinking and re-thinking this point, it became
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clearer how the categories that people attribute to themselves (or that are attributed to them)
are negotiated differently in different moments. A Syrian-Circassian in Egypt may be keener
to claim a connection to the label of “Arab” than a Syrian-Circassian in the Caucasus. The
category, like other categories, is negotiated.129
People who share common label do not project a shared attitude on most matters.
Circassian groups in Jordan are different from the ones in Turkey, the Circassians in
Palestine, Syria, and in the North West Caucasus. In fact, in Abkhazia nationality was one of
the key markers of social and economic status. Whereas most of the Syrian Circassians in
Abkhazia at the moment went there muttareen, as forced migrants Jordanians and Turkish
nationals have different reasons for visiting. During fieldwork conversations, Syrians would
refer to Jordanian nationals and Circassians as zanageel(or rich people) and would say that
unlike them the Syrians do not have masary (capital, or money) to start business projects in
the country. Many of the Jordanians that visit Abkhazia do so in summer vacations to get
their paperwork done and leave back to Jordan afterwards, although I have met a few
Jordanians who have been living in the region for years.130
If anything, this fieldwork project has also taught me that “Circassians,” along with
any other group of people that may share a common label are not homogenous. One of the
messages I want to express through this project pays tribute not only to dismantling the
understandings of refuge as monolithic beings that lack agency, but also to the heterogeneity
of Circassians and Syrians. Hopefully it will even allows one to second guess that are
categories spoon fed to most of us and that we continue to reproduce in speech and practice.
129
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Most of all I want to it to open for readers the windows of imagining other realities, to
dismantle the givens of the nation-state and all the symbolism of nationalism. To rethinkall
that such givens destroy, produce, and raise within us.

Ethical Considerations and (In)-Sensitivity:
“… I have become a resala, (thesis)” one of the women I had planned to interview in
Egypt said as she recalled her encounter with an American researcher. When I told her that
this research was for my Master’s thesis, Um Waleed said she had already spoken to an
American girl who was doing research with Syrians in Egypt. Initially, Um Waleed thought
this girl would be able to help her with migration paperwork and was disappointed to find out
the girl was only there for research purposes. The fact that there is no direct benefit for the
participants of a research project frequently poses an ethical dilemma, almost as though we
profit from observing the suffering of others, without doing anything to alleviate it.
Any type of research, including fieldwork, could be insensitive, or even exploitative.
In an article entitled “Palestinian refugees are not at your service,” on Electronic Intifada,
journalist Moe Ali Nayel provides one example of this exploitative fieldwork. He recounts
his experience translating for a Harvard student keen on collecting data from a Palestinian
refugee who fled Yarmook camp from Syria into Lebanon. The student, Nayel recounts, was
rude, insensitive to the story of the woman she was interviewing, and was only keen on
gathering her data. Nayel quotes a Palestinian man: “Are you enjoying filming our misery?
Film. Its fine, you are like the others. You show up in the camp, film, leave, and we are still
here.”131
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I have encountered people making similar comments in Egypt’s slums and other
poverty-stricken areas. The idea is that people visit, taken pictures, and leave never to be seen
again. The “interlocutors” have had to watch writers, journalists, academics, and filmmakers
from across the world stroll through their camps; get their stories, pictures, research, and
films only to leave and never come back. What makes well-done ethnographic fieldwork
different, however, is the fact that its long-term nature forces the research to build a stronger
relationship with his/her research participants (a relationship that is up to the anthropologist
to maintain.) Anthropologists working on violence and issues of vulnerability, have even
more difficult questions that confronting them. Schepher-Hughes and Bourgois ask: “what
does the anthropologist then want from his/her audience? What of the people whose suffering
is made a public spectacle for the sake of theoretical argument?”132
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(Figure 4)

Visualizing Snippets of Life in Abkhazia
“For if indeed foundational thoughts are seen as collapsing, if indeed utopias
are arguments about order and foundational thoughts, and if indeed the savage
exists primarily within an implicit correspondence with utopia, the specialist
in savagery is in dire straits. He does not know what to aim at, His favorite
model has disappeared or, when found, refuses to pose as expected. The
fieldworker examines his tools and finds his camera inadequate. Most
importantly, his very field of vision now seems blurred. Yet he needs to come
back home with a picture. It’s pouring rain out there, and the mosquitoes are
starting to bite. In desperation, the baffled anthropologist burns his notes to
create a moment of light, moves his face against the flame, closes his eyes,
and, hands grasping his camera, takes a picture of himself.”133
“To suffer is one thing; another thing is living with the photographed images of suffering,
which does not necessarily strengthen conscience and the ability to be compassionate. It can
also corrupt them. Once one has seen such images, one has started down the road of seeing
more—and more. Images transfix. Images anesthetize. An event known through photographs
133
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certainly becomes more real that it would have been if one had never seen the photographs—
think of the Vietnam War. (For a counter example, think of the Gulag Archipelago, of which
we have no photographs.) But after repeated exposure to images it also becomes less real.”134
–Susan Sontag
~~~
Rahma kindly invited me to a get-together the women were having at her house. The
kids played while the older women had their coffee, cigarettes, and (really good)
Syrian snacks. Dina showed us family photographs from Syria. One of the photos
was of her husband, who passed away when Ayman (her son) was a baby. At the time
the photograph was taken, Dina’s husband has still been a conscript in the Syrian
army. In the small black and white photograph he sits, wearing his military uniform,
on what looks one of the small army beds with thin mattresses. A portrait of Hafez
Al-Asad above him hung above his head. There were other photographs, of Ayman,
Heba, and Rhama when they were young and of Dina’s wedding. Later, Rahma
would tell me that they were able to bring their family photographs with them
because they had time to plan for their travel. Other Syrians did not get the same
chance, she would add.

There are two cafés that are on the sea ends of two parallel wooden ports, always
surrounded by fishermen. One of them is more of a fancy restaurant that sells sushi and has
hookah. The other is called “Amra,” and is run by two older women who sell Turkish coffee
and baked goods. Farah and I sat in Amra, and drank coffee. We spoke about Syria, Egypt,
her fiancée, Nalchik, the city where she goes attends university and studies tourism, and of
course we spoke about what I study as well. I was thinking about of writing my research
about how dependent on documents we are made to be, I tell her and we talk about it. I’m
thinking of doing something visual for the project too, I add. I want to make photographs.
“But why?” she asked me, “We’re not refugees.” Her question put me on the spot. “Yes…I
don’t want to portray people in a bad way, of course,” I said hoping not to sound defensive.
“If you have to take pictures maybe you can just take them without people noticing,” But I
don’t want to do that it’s not necessary, I tell her, and the conversation moves onto how
Abkhazian television filmed her and her friends at school when they were first here, because
they were Syrian. She hadn’t had her hair done or make up on, she said lightly.
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“To photograph is to appropriate the thing being photographed. It means putting
oneself into a certain relation to the world that feels like knowledge—and therefore, like
power,”135 Susan Sontag writes in On Photography. The relationship between the
photographer and the photographed, the represented and the one who represents is already
one of authority, although the clear cut dichotomy ultimately does not exist. Who really
makes the photograph– constructed as it may be- what it is? And who really makes the
ethnography – also constructed as it may be- what it is? Some of the stories I have collected
here are my own, but most are not.
“Pictures of refugees are now a key vehicle in the elaboration of a transnational social
imagination of refugeeness,” Liisa Malkki wrote in 1996. We now have an image, an idea, in
our minds of a “refugee” is “supposed to look like, often these are images of women and
children next to tents, or more recently, photos of children like Aylan Kurdi dead and washed
up on the shore. The most dramatic images enter the market of photojournalism.
136

“Commodified imagery threatens photographers’ primary role as storytellers. Amplified

technique threatens to dominate the image, and it will lead to picturesque gluttony,” as one
photojournalist describes it, the “image product has been reduced to the glib one-off drama,”
it.137Most importantly, for me at least, is the person in the photograph cannot talk back. One
cannot help but wonder how the subject of the photograph, feels after seeing their vulnerable
moments reified and made into images for the public.
Images, in their conscription to the world of journalism, are expected to shock, arrest
attention, startle, and surprise.138Photographs can be commodities in a capitalist media
market that feeds off of the most dramatic of images. The suffering displayed thus becomes
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commercialized and “taken up into processes of global marketing and business
competition.”139 They can be absorbed into what is the rational, bureaucratic, mode of
running society; most documents now have to be accompanied by a photograph of the
citizen’s face, usually in alienating ways (when you are not allowed to smile for passport
pictures).140Photographs can be an object of “evidence,” of “truth,” and they can also be a
tool of modern nation-state surveillance, enrolled to service to institutions of control.
Foucault’s conception of the panopticism immediately comes to mind, “the gaze is alert
everywhere.”141
The most problematic aspect of the practice of photography to reflect on is the idea
that it is “more than passive observing.”142This provokes both questions of whether a
photograph sheds light on a story, or how much of a role it plays in “the status quo remaining
unchanged (at lease of as long as it takes to get a ‘good’ picture.)” The idea that photos can
muster feelings of moral outrage is bogged down depending on the degree of familiarity with
these types of images.143 Instead, it seems increasingly more likely that to photograph misery
is to “be in complicity with whatever makes a subject interesting, with photographing—
including, when that is the interest, another person’s pain or misfortune.”144In other words,
“to take a photograph is to participate in another person’s (or thing’s) mortality, vulnerability,
mutability.”145
The photographs in this chapter do not follow a particularly apparent storyline or
narrative, although that is ultimately up to the reader/viewer to decide and interpret. They are,
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as I saw the field, unordered, ambiguous, and seemingly arbitrary. I have added photos from
the school, the classes, what I have seen as “symbols of the state” reaffirmed in flags, photos,
and billboards. There are photos of homes, as well as of the United Nations peacekeeping
site, now part of a “hotel” where the Syrians were made to stay upon their arrival to
Abkhazia. My favorites are the photographs of the food, both Abkhazian (Russian?) and of
course, Syrian. With the above critiques in mind, and with a never fully answered question of
why? I found the camera useful with regards to building a sort of connection with people by
taking portraits of them, with them, or maybe not of them but of their children, and then
printing the photographs and giving them back. While there is always the grappling and
gripping with not turning people into a spectacle, maybe there is something flattering about
someone seeing something beautiful in you (and not in the sense of exoticism).Also, there is
something slightly different in the visual representation and the textual one, in the sense that
(at least nowadays, and at least in the initial stages), a photographic representation is instant.
At once, after the photograph has been taken, you can show it to whomever you had
photographed. Anyway, in order to not let the textual override the visual too much, I will just
present the photographs below. To respect the anonymity of my interlocutors whose
narratives and quotes I have injected into this thesis, they do not appear in any of the
photographs unless they are giving their backs to the camera.
~~~
“In a world ruled by photographic images, all borders (“framing”) seem arbitrary.
Anything can be separated, can be made discontinuous, from anything else: all
that is necessary is to frame the subject differently.”146
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This is a document I had to write before going through with passport procedures in Abkhazia. It
includes my name, a very short life history, and the fact that I study anthropology. (Figure 5)

56

This is the “repatriation” building, where people go to get their paperwork done. (Figure 6)

An Armenian man shows me his passport at the Russia-Abkhazia borders upon my entrance to
Abkhazia. (Figure 7)
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Syrian television plays in the background at home in Abkhazia.(Figures 8, 9)
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The Abkhazian military parades in celebration of the ‘independence day,’ marking their separatism
from Georgia. (Figures 10, 11)
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Children celebrate national flag day, in August 2015. (Figure 12)

A billboard sign of Abkhazia’s current president stands in Sukhum’s streets. ( Figure 13)
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Former UN peacekeeping site – now turned hotel – where the Syrians were made to stay upon arrival.

(Figures 14, 15)
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The Abkhazian parliamentary building that was burned down during the war in 1992. It was a site of
heavy fighting between the Abkhaz and the Georgian troops. Lily, the girl in the photograph below
showed me around the building. (Figures 16, 17)
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These are photographs and memorials made for the people that were killed in the 1992 war with
Georgia. Yes, we called them shuhadaa’ (martyrs) in Arabic and I do not particularly know why.
(Figures 18, 19)
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This is a photograph of poster a man dressed in Circassian costume. Behind the poster, one can see
the mountainous landscape that fills Abkhazia. (Figure 20)
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Russian classes, inside the Tenth school, were a significant site for my fieldwork. (Figures 21, 22)
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There two photos were taken from inside the Tenth school. (Figures 24, 25)
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“It is a beautiful country, but there is no work,” one Syrian woman told me about Abkhazia,
elaborating that, you can sit and watch the nature forever, but where will you get your meals? (Figures
26, 27)
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Lake Ritza (Figure 26)

The Black Sea at sunset (Figure 27)

68

Looking at the mountains ( Figures 28, 29)
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Windows (Figures 30, 31)
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Syrian meals are served during gatherings that the Syrian women set up for themselves. (Figures 32,
33)
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Hookah and tea (Figures 34, 35, 36)
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Interlocutors prepare snacks and meals for me in their homes. (Figures 37, 38)
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The Market (Figure 39)

An Abkhazian woman prepares for the winter by storing peppers. (Figure 40)
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Abkhazian food stands (Figures 41, 42)
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Narmez hangs up the photos that I took of him and his family. (Figure 43)

A Syrian mother and her son walk home after a long day working at the Arabic café, owned by a
Jordanian-Circassian man. (Figure 44)
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Make-Believe Statehood
“And what could be more powerful than the modern state? For the world of magic is
changing, has changed… wasn’t it Lenin himself who wrote in 1919 that now nearly
all political disputes and differences of opinion turn on the concept of the state, …
more particularly on the question: what is the state?”147
“In world history, we are concerned only with those people’s that have formed states
[because] all the value that human beings possess, all of their spiritual reality, they
have through the state alone.” Hegel148
“When people today describe the status of Abkhazia, they use phrases such as:
‘between heaven and earth,’ ‘between East and West,’ ‘between the hammer and the
anvil,’ ‘between…’—this borderline situation correctly describes our position.”149
“The newest Black Sea state of all, however, is not imaginary; I reached the end of
the road in tiny Abkhazia, which broke away from Georgia only in 1992, and I tried
there to measure the reality or unreality of Abkhazian independence against all that I
had learned on the journey until then.”150

Crowds gather in front of a stage during ‘national flag day’ celebrations in August. (Figure
45)
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Making sense of the field was ambiguous from the first hours of first day, as I looked around,
trying to understand where I was while the car moved between the green mountainous curves
that took us from the Sochi border to Sukhum, the capital of Abkhazia. By the end of a twomonth fieldwork period, the scenesthat were part of my daily-scape were almost etched in my
mind. In a short walk on the port of Sukhum one could see: the old men playing shakhmat
(chess in Russian) by the Armenian coffeeshop - ahwet el awageez or ahwet el khatayra as
we called it151 - tourists lying on the peppered rocky shores of the Black Sea, the Turkish
cafes lined up one after the other, occasionally interrupted by a souvenir shop, and the ice
cream booths where we got ourmarojanaye (in Russian)or booza(in Syrian dialect). On any
given morning on the pier of Sukhum, one can see how the forested mountains hug the Black
sea from left and right, and can imagine how straight ahead the sea will wind up on the
Turkish coast. 152
Syrians friends say that all of Sukhum wouldn’t be an alley in Syria, and upon hearing
the population size, Egyptian friends would tell me that it would not even make up a street in
Shubra. Friends (interlocutors?) in Abkhazia and I joked that there were only two main
streets in Sukhum, the street for hanging out in the morning, and the street for hanging out at
night. The two streets are parallel to each other. As long as there was still daylight, the shops,
which included mostly expensive (but not very trendy) clothing stores, on the “morning
street” would remain open. There were two popular daily destinations on this street are: the
renek- souq in Arabic- or, the marketplace in English, where fruit and vegetable vendors including the “Turkish place” that sold halal meat are all located. On the other end was the
tenth school (el madrasa el ‘ashera), where the DRC’s Russian lessons were held. Bus stops
were also scattered on this street, and were important for those who did not live in Sukhumi.
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The “night-time” street is the pier, where at one point, Syrian men who visited Abkhazia in
the late 80s and early 90s told me, hundreds of people could be seen all throughout the shore.
“You wouldn’t find space to walk,” one man said. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union,
hundreds of Georgians occupied the same spaces that are now quickly emptied out by the end
of the summer when Russian tourists go back home. Abkhazia - once known as the Soviet
Union’s “Red Riviera”- is now a country dependent almost solely on its tourism industry.
Western states warn their citizens from travelling to the “Russian occupied regions of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia,” while online travel guides warn travelers that they will not
have access to consular help in case of any emergencies in Georgia’s breakaway regions. 153A
great deal of Western historical scholarship on Eastern Europe, and more specifically the
Northern Caucasus have been painted the region as especially “violent.” Scholarship and
media representations often imagine these as spaces where the “primordial” or “barbaric”
ethno-nationalisms violently erupted after having been boxed in and held under a tight lid of
“socialism” by the former Soviet Union.154With conflicts that range from the Yugoslav
succession, to Chechnya, to Nagorno-Karabakh, to Abkhazia and South Ossetia it becomes
easy to see the region as one where “ethno-nationalisms” and created separatist wars. Implicit
in such representations is the assumption that there are “primordial” nationalisms that are
opposed to more “civil” and “liberal” forms of nationalisms.
As stated previously, Abkhazia (along with South Ossetia) is most popularly termed a
“separatist state,” a “rebel republic,” an “artificial state,” or “Georgia’s breakaway region.”
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For many, it is the “homeland.” Yet in the eyes of the international world order, and the
taken-for-granted recognized states, its lack of international recognition and its “illegality,”
according to international law, it is not really a state..The following chapter (hopefully) does
two things. First invites readers, and myself to question what a “real” state is. What can the
supposed “unreal,” unrecognized “non-state state” tell us about the states that are deemed
“real” and that are worthy of “recognition”? Second, this chapter sets the stage for a thesis
project that describes statehood in terms of performative, or ritualistic, sets of practices that
include war-making and nation-building processes, as well as border-creation and citizenship
production.
I argue that the desire for statehood grants legitimacy to the modern nation-state
system but at once exposes its fragility. A ‘state’ like Abkhazia, paradoxically called a ‘nonstate’ state, still maneuvers within the very system that it is locked out of, but the way such
unrecognized states are shunned from the ‘family of nations’ can reveal a how constructed
and hallucinatory the state-system is. In another sense, looking at Abkhazia’s state
performativity, or the fictitious aura that arises from the notion of an Abkhazian nationality,
can tell us about the taken-for-granted fictitious characters of other states.155Ultimately, most
of the practices of administration in Abkhazia are not so much different from other states and
their own practices of make-believeness.156It catalogues its citizens, like other states, by
producing documents to categorize them and it has its own myths built on ideas of the nation,
war, and purity, much like other states and their nationalisms.
The notions of the “state,” dawla, “nation,” watan, and “nationalism,” qawmeya are
very intimate and conflated in many interesting yet problematic ways. This ethnography, as
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with a large portion of anthropological work, deals with large, widely-used and hard to define
concepts. So what does it mean to “be” a state? What does it signify to act and to function
like a state? Why is the “state” often opposed to “chaos”? What does it mean to “fail” at
being a state… to fail to maintain an accepted, recognized place in a world of nation-states?
Can a condition of “liminality” exist between being a state and not being one, or for existing
as a “non-state” between two states? Is there “full” state-ness and “partial” state-ness? How
are statehood performed? 157 Is nationalism one of the props for the performance? What does
adding the extra “ethno” in the word “ethno-nationalism” signify?158 Do people only have
space in the territories of states if they can conform to their nationalisms? This chapter does
not necessarily provide answers to all of these questions, but it reflects on the impact such
notions of ethnicity, the state, and the nation, have as well as on the implications of their
(de)construction.
~~~
There are only big families and mafias, and the strongest of the families gets its
way. There is no law. What is the point of attending a university that is not
recognized, not even by Russia? Even if you get your diploma from the
“Abkhazia State University,” … you cannot actually get a job abroad with it.
No one knows it.
These are just bits and pieces of the comments and concerns that I have heard
Syrian mothers, students, and men express about living in Abkhazia, where life
can get boring because there is “nothing.” That is why many of the young men
have left; they cannot live the rest of their lives as night guards in hotels that
work for just three months of the year, Farah, for example, explained as she
spoke about her 20-year-old brother who is now getting bored waiting for lam
el shaml in Europe.159
At least the “state,” or the commitet – the authority responsible for repatriate
affairs–pays for the apartments, at least, I have often heard after long
complicated stories about what everyday life in Abkhazia entails… but
officials from the commitet gathered many of the Syrians around in early
157
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February and told them that “the state” can longer pay for their apartments. It
has helped them get a head start on life in Abkhazia, but they will have to
continue the rest on their own. The commitet will pay for only those families
that are most in need.

~~~

The Permanent Limbo and the Make-Believe:
It is easy to look at Abkhazia and deem it an anomaly, or even as part of a “wide array
of existing sovereign anomalies.”160 These are entities that “look like states and act like states
but lack legal international recognition and so exist outside the ‘community of nations.’”161
De-facto states like Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Kharabakh, the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus and more, are considered “liminal enclaves.” Often this is due to the fact
that they have to withstand economic embargo and political isolation that “resemble the
conditions of a siege.”162 It seems to be the case that people, academics included, cannot
seem to determine the adjectives they wish to use when describing such entities and often use
oxymoronic descriptions. For example, Nina Caspersen says that unrecognized states desire
to demonstrate unity and consensus but can have multi-party democracies. They show
tendencies of being both “open and closed, pluralistic and homogenous.” 163
If one revisits Victor Turner, and his idea of rites of passages (Rites de Passage) that
come in phases, liminality seems at the outset to be an interesting way to analyze Abkhazia,
as “liminal”. There are three phases to a transition: separation, margin (limen- or “threshold”
in Latin), and aggregation.164 The first phase is that of separation, which can consist of anysymbolic- behavior signifying the detachment of an individual or a group from an earlier
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social structure, or condition. The second phase, the one that interests us in this chapter most,
is the “liminal” period. This period is characterized by ambiguity, a limbo of “status-lessness,” a condition of eluding and slipping through common networks of classifications.
Liminal entities are “neither here nor there,” betwixt between the positions arrayed by law,
custom and convention.165 The third phase is that of reincorporation, when the subject
becomes relatively more stable, begins to have rights and obligations, and fits into a clearly
defined structure once again.
Yet, there are problematics of this theory of liminality do not end with the fact that it
falsely assumes clearly set phases of structures, or that it presumes a final clearly defined
structure. The problem also lies in the assumption that the liminal is infused with glitches.
Instead of thinking of Abkhazia as a space of permanent liminality, I prefer to borrow
Navaro-Yashin’s conception of the “make-believe space.”166 Again, this is not to pick on
Abkhazia and deem it an irregularity, just as Navaro-Yashin points that the notion of the
“make-believe” space was not intended to pick on the unrecognized state of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus. The make-believe is a social form that refers not only to
spatiality and territoriality, but also to modes of governance, administration and material
practice. The category, as she makes use of it, dismantles conceptualizations that view the
“phantasmic” or illusory and the tangible effects of the state as one. “The material crafting is
the making. The phantasmic is the believing.”167 While Navaro-Yashin transliterates the
Turkish words that the Turkish-Cypriots used to describe the territory as literally meaning
“made-up,” the Syrian interlocutors I worked with often spoke about Abkhazia as a place
where there is no state, ma fi dāwla. Like Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia is a space crafted in
the aftermath of a war. Also like Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia has been crafted into two
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senses, a material one through actual practices on the territory as well as in the political
imaginations of many of the people who now inhabit this territory and take part in the
spectacles from which states are imagined and created. The make-believe-ness of these is
states is not unique to them, but is testimonial to the make-believe qualities of other, more
recognized states. It also serves to remind us that states do not form themselves in vacuum.
“This book is about a make-believe space,” Navaro-Yashin says about her
ethnography, and I am tempted to say the same about this thesis.168I must admit that I too had
put Abkhazia in a box of peculiarity and found myself constantly thinking during fieldwork
about how “this place is so weird.” This “weirdness” that I attributed to the place and to the
“nationalisms” within it can only ring true if we are to ignore the wider political, economic,
social, and historical context from which the processes that made modern day Abkhazia
emerged. Just as state-making and capital penetration have been important in understanding
wider global phenomena, they are also important for understanding Eastern European
nationalisms.169Therefore, one must keep in mind arguments such as those of Kathernie
Verdery when she likens the “post-socialism” of Eastern European states to the “postcolonialism” of other states in the world.170 The creation of post-colonial states has been
accompanied by processes similar to those taking place in the world of the former Soviet
Union, she argues.
East European state-making after the break-up of the Soviet Union began to take
place during a world context of capitalist re-organization.171Verdery further points out that
such “state-building” activities, which often also entail that power relations are re-organized,
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carried with them the possibility of inducing conflicts between different ethno-national
groups. This is, in part, because of the “post-socialist” character of the states after the
decomposition of “Party rule,” which had already played on nationalistic manifestations
rather than anything else. Party rule had functioned by reifying and institutionalizing the
ethno-national principle.172 Later, it would be at the expense of other forms of organization
that that the nationality principal was employed. This principle was present during the statebuilding processes that included “writing new constitutions, establishing criteria for political
citizenship, recasting at least some state institutions, filling those institutions with new
personnel, setting new terms for the relationship to ‘foreign capital’ and to homogenize local
populations.”173 Again, these practices do not sound far too different from the practices of
other internationally recognized states.

States and Nations – Imagining and Institutionalizing Ethnicity:

You have to write a different surname, the Syrian man at the commitet told me.
His name is Rassem, now in his late 40s, he’s been here in Abkhazia since his
early 20s. He works at the commitet and helps to translate for Arabic-speakers
and tells us what steps we have to take to get the passport. Abaza qawmeya he
said, “Abaza is a nationality… not a family.” I think this might have been one
of the strangest sentences I have ever heard in my life.
We took the first left after the commitet to get to the only Kodak photography
shop in Sukhum (and probably in all of Sukhum). I saw an elderly Syrian
couple in front of the photo studio and I said hi; it was still my second day and
I was excited to meet people. The woman, whose daughter I had later met,
asked me if I was from Egypt after she heard me speak, “it shows,” she said.
She and her husband are from Damascus. She asked me what I thought of
Abkhazia so far, is it better than Egypt. I replied half jokingly that everything
and anything is better than Egypt. She Responded “No, it’s your country.
Nothing is better than your country; if they ask you to choose between heaven
and your country… [you should choose] your country” she said adding that
that is how she felt about Syria. Her husband, Faisal Abaza, said “well, this is
her country,” about me and Abkhazia.
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We went back to the commitet and gave them the passport photos. Rassem told
me to write that I am from usūl Yagan (Yagan origins).174

Since my arrival to the country, I heard on several occasions Abkhazians (the few
who spoke English) and Syrians say that Abkhazia needs citizens. On my first night in the
country, I went with my father to visit an Abkhazian friend of his named Dima. Another
Turkish-Abkhazian man, with broken English, sat with us and helped in translation. I
remember one of the things he said, which had made a quick impression on me, was that
there were “too many” Armenians in Abkhazia and not enough Abkhaz. There was no
mention of Syrians and the distribution of passports, however. Later on in the trip, in picnics
(that I was so kindly invited to), after Russian class, on the beach, over coffee at home,
almost all of the Syrians I spoke to made sense of the fact that they got a funded trip to the
country, by telling me that Abkhazia needs people- citizens- (hūmmā bedhūm nās) in order to
gain international recognition. This brings forth the question of how certain informal
“communities” become institutionalized categories of “nationalities” through demographic
state practices.175
Shami’s studies the ‘encounters’ that people from the diaspora (Jordan and Turkey)
have experienced their “return” to the homeland after the break-up of the Soviet Union. She
argues that upon encountering the homeland, “ethnicity is suddenly experienced not as a fact
but as a contradiction.”176 Popular definitions of ethnicity have pointed to the conception of
the ethnic community as an extension of the self. A common ethnicity is thus expected to
constitute a ‘sameness’ or a familiarity, but the more salient experience that accompanies
men and women’s journeys to the Caucasus is generally one of shock, of non-recognition,
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and of experiencing “the self as other.”177 The self in this sense is understood in abstract
terms of cultural characteristics, symbols of identity, and of particular physical
characteristics. Yet, when the ‘encounters’ are finally made, people feel estranged on
multiple levels. ‘They’ (Circassians in the Caucasus) do not look like ‘us’ (Circassians in the
Middle East) Shami quotes. Even the dances, which are a fundamental feature of Circassian
associations in Jordan and Syria, are different.
This alienation, she writes, translates into mistrust. It is not a mistrust of certain
individuals alone but of North Caucasian society as a whole, which people then begin
describe as “immoral.”178 Obviously, as Shami herself notes, these perceptions differ, often
according to the country from which the person comes, among other factors. For those
families who had migrated back permanently, socializing tended to take place amongst those
who come from the same country, Shami notes. People also tended to refer to each other as
‘the Turks,’ ‘the Syrians,’ ‘the Jordanians,’ to the Circassians of the Caucasus as ‘the
Russians, and in my case, ‘the Abkhaz.’’ Many of the stories I have heard from Syrians and
Jordanians in Abkhazia roughly echo similar ideas, and many of these practices Shami lists I
had also noted and participated in. To take the reader back to the elderly Syrian men’s gettogether for coffee by the sea in the morning example, one of these mornings as I sat with
them listening, wondering if they thought it was strange I was so interested in sitting with
them. The conversation soon turned to business. This meant that the conversation began to
discuss “the Turks,” who seem to be running some of the most successful businesses in a
country that barely has a mall. “We call them Attrāk, ‘Turks’ but they’re Abkhaz,” one of
them turned to me and said mid-conversation as I sat silently and listened. I nodded.
The hegemonic use of the word “nation” refers to a construct that entails a
relationship between an actual or potential state to its subjects – the nation – “and
177
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distinguishes them from the subjects of other states.”179 The idea of a nation posits
“sameness,” or “oneness” and nationalism is the political (and emotional) use of the symbols
of the nation.180Mann’s definition seems to imply a synonymy between “ethnicities” and
“nations” as he says that a “nation” or the Greek term ethos, or an ethnic group, is a “a people
that shares a common culture and sense of heritage, distinct from other peoples.”181 Mann
warns that nationalism becomes dangerous when it is “politicized,” or when it “represents the
perversion of modern aspirations to democracy in the nation-state,” but that point brings one
to the question: Is nationalism ever separate from a political project?
~~~
In Syria, everyone was just sharkas, Rahma tells me. There are differences
now, differences that weren’t there before. Now there are Abazāt and other
sharkas. Some people here made different lineages so that they can get
apartments and the nationality more easily.
~~~
We greeted each other outside the commitet, they were walking out and I was
on the street walking to the apartment but it was the first time I had ever seen
them. “We heard you were doing a Master’s or shī heik (something like that)?”
one of the three elderly Syrian men asked me. “Yes,” I responded, wondering
how he had heard. “I want to do research here about the repatriates.”
“About the repatriates or the refugees…?”
I remember I wasn’t sure how to answer. “Hmm about anyone … I don’t
know..,” I self-consciously uttered.
“Well, because here they would treat the Abaza like repatriates but not the
rest… they treat an Abaza like a chicken falling into a pot of soup,” one of the
men, who had a friendly spirit and a cheerful face joked.
~~~
Layla, a 15 years old girl from Damascus, attends both the adult and
children’s Russian classes. This means she goes to class six days a week, and
although she’s been here just four months and I had been there for much less I
could sense her quick improvements. I always notice her huge sunglasses, her
camel colored boots, and her Circassian-flagged pin on her backpack. We
agree that the Russian language is hard, and she tells me that Russians and
Abkhazians would have a difficult time learning Arabic if they were to go to
Egypt or Syria.
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One afternoon after class, I walked with her halfway to her new home
up the hill tops, as she told me that she likes everything in Abkhazia, except
the Abkhaz, although admittedly some of them are ḥabābīn (lovable.)“But I
am not Abaza,” Doaa explained to me although her mother is. Layla, on the
other hand, is Kabardey, like her father. He is in Finland, and they are waiting
in Abkhazia until he does lam el shaml (family reunion and paperwork) for
them. Because she is Kabardey and not Abaza, Doaa’s passport will take
longer to be made than her mother’s. Rassem told them the same thing at the
commitet that he told me when her mother wrote her last name as “Abaza” in
the paperwork. Abaza is a nationality and she has to write down an origin.

~~~
Eric Hobsbawm similarly argues that the word “nation” has historically subsumed
different forms of relationships. The two most dominant modern forms of being a nation are
the relation known as ‘citizenship’ and the relation known as ‘ethnicity.’182 Yet because no
state’s borders contain a population that is ethnically uniform, the two meanings of “nation”
are seen to be at odds with one another and each is defined in ways that almost always
necessarily depend on exclusions. A citizenship-based definition of nation can exclude
people based on gender, race and (lack of) ownership of property (clearly people without
recognized paperwork are excluded as well).183
Any ethnic definition of the nation will, by its definition, exclude potential citizens.
Ethnicity is not an objective fact, and ethnic conflicts are neither biological nor primordial.
Both ethnicity and ethnic conflicts are based on social relations and are socially created.184
Michael Mann, along with many other scholars, has pointed out that while ethnic groups are
defined by their shared common culture, and their shared common descent, culture is vague
and common descent is “usually fictitious.”185When considering Abkhazia, and the Syrians,
Jordanians, Turks, and Egyptians who have been given passports, both the citizenship-based
and ethnic-based definitions of “nation” become very mushy. The ethnographic material I
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narrated above is telling of how these definitions of nationality- both citizenship and ethnicbased are arbitrary and become codified into categories in chancy ways.
With this in mind, one can begin to review what becomes obscured when the words
“state” and “nation are used synonymously. To add to this point, or even when it is taken-forgranted and presumed that a nation can exist “only when a state has a unified administrative
reach over the territory over which its sovereignty is claimed.”186 Both Verdery and Trouillot
problematize these perceptions and argue that they are representative of the dominant,
“western-imposed” definitions and uses of these terms that are not necessarily applicable
everywhere. Such usages, Verdery argues, can further “the process whereby the idea of
‘nation-state’ becomes hegemonic in world politics.”187 She points to how the word “nation”
in modern times has had more than one meaning: it can be the name of a cultural relationship
that links state and subject or it can be a putative imagined community with which statesubjects - “who acknowledge an existing or hoped for”- state administration are encouraged
to identify. In Eastern Europe a “nation” has (at best) a tenuous relation to the territorial
limits of polities and is often more about ethno-cultural homogeneity.188Trouillot also says
that “nation-building can operate within the state, against the state, or in the name of the
state.”189 In Eastern Europe (as with other places) “nations” spill across state lines and
borders and it is far more common that states administer territories that contain more than
only one ethno-nation, which is frequently the case the Caucasus.190I bring up ethnicity and
the conditions of its construction, as well as where it stands in terms of war-making and statebuilding practices because of how this construct (of sects, ethnicities, and other categories) is
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used in narratives and explanations of war. In an essay entitled “On the Syrian Question,” the
author recaps that analysts and policy makers from across the political spectrum commit to an
understanding of the situation in Syria as one “in which the distinction between an ‘Alawi
regime allied with Shi’a Iran and a Sunni majority population supported by Sunni Saudi
Arabia and other gulf countries is an epistemological starting point for analysis and policy
decisions.” Yet this is an “infelicitous” choice, the author argues. Sectarian tensions are not
the causes of the current conflict; they are, instead “deliberate regime strategy.”191
Sectarianism should not be read as “a continuation of traditional, pre-political forms of
solidarity that were repressed by the modern post-colonial state only to surface in violent
forms when the state enters into a period of fragility.”192 Instead, it should be viewed as is a
mode of governance, and an instrument of control, constitutive of the modern state and its
colonial pedigree. 193
The state in and of our minds:
“Look at the Kurds, they don’t have a state, but they are working to get one.
They have a television channel and the world knows about them, and they have
a state within a state,” Danny said whilst talking about how Abkhaz are not
working hard enough towards forming a ‘state.’
~~~
Sherief Abaza is a man whose name I’ve heard countless times during
fieldwork. Sometimes he came up positively, have you heard of Sharaf? You
have to talk to him for your research; he’s responsible for the repatriates, he
was a member of parliament in Syria. “He’s a very prestigious man!” Other
times his name came up negatively for the exact same reasons: he’s responsible
for the affairs of repatriates, and he decides who to help or not based on his
own friendships and family relations… it’s all about masārī (money) people
say before they retell stories of who bribed whom at the commitet. And he was
a member of parliament back in Syria, what more corruption do you want?

~~~
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Amany told me, just one or two days before I had to leave back to Egypt, that
some people may have thought I was mūkhabārāt , intelligence, at first. That
did not surprise me. I carried that fear along with me before even starting
fieldwork; and now I believe that fear comes with doing anthropology and
research. I told Amany that I didn’t blame people if they thought that of course,
and that sometimes I have this fear too. Sometimes, in whiffs of paranoia, I
wonder in the back of my head about whether certain people may not be the
best to speak to for this reason. Of course, she agreed… like Sharaf. She told
me it is better that I did not speak to him. He’s here to work for the Syrian
mūkhabārāt and the Russian mūkhabārāt, she said. His brother, Mamduh
Abaza (think of pseudonym) is the one who destroyed Hama in 1982… He is
responsible for killing all of these people and no one dare say a word about it
all those years. His military officer brother came to Abkhazia and just took the
family name Marshan, her family name heik ‘afeya, by force.
~~~
A small Abkhazian flag flutters next to the driver in a nearly empty bus in
Abkhazia. A small Russian flag stands next to the rear view mirror in the bus
in Sochi, Russia. Maryam wears her Syrian rubber band flag, with two stars,
everyday… she loves it, she says and she is happy when I give her a
photograph I took of the bracelet on her hand. Her daughter, Sina, possibly the
cutest little girl ever, sings the chant, “Allah, w Sūrya, w Bashar.” Vladislav
Ardzinba’s photos are everywhere, some of them have the number 70 next to
them, I wondered why. Someone told me it is because he would have been 70
by now, if he had been alive, and then I wonder how they will keep writing the
numbers of all the ages he would have been in the coming years. An obituaryarticle on him casually says, “he was not exactly tolerant of contrary
opinions.”In Egypt, once I am back, I am welcomed in the airport by a large
poster showing president Sisi, posing on his side, with his head held high. In
the background is the “new Suez Canal,” and I am thankful that I was not
present when during the few days of the motto- “Egypt is celebrating.”
Although I did overhear some men in Abkhazia talking about the Egyptian
president over coffee in the morning—and I could not help myself from telling
them, in very broken Russian, that I thought everything in Egypt was plokha,
and Sisi is kak Stalin (“bad” in Russian, and Sisi is like Satlin). Are these
moments and instances of thinking, wondering, and seeing the state? Or are
they instances of reifying and fetishizing the notion?

In the book, Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey, Navaro-Yashin
analyzes and breaks down the binary between state and society. In other words, she argues
that it through the everyday conversations and habits of “society” that the state is
constructed.194It is also in our – the state’s supposed subjects- thoughts. By proposing the
breakdown of this binary, Navaro-Yashin leans back on Philip Abram's 1988 essay, "Notes
on the difficulty of studying the state," in which he suggests that the notion of the existence
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of the state is the greatest myth of modern times.195 Anthropologies of the state are now, for
the most part, distant from an entrenched image of the state as a “rationalized, administrative
form of political organization.”196It is increasingly the cases that in emerging literature which
attempts to study the “state” as fetishistic (as Taussig theorized it), or as a notion by focusing
on the everyday discourse that makes it up.197
Not only is the state imagined as rational but it is also imagined as “an always
incomplete project ,” constantly spoken of “through an invocation of the wilderness,
lawlessness and savagery that not only lies outside its jurisdiction but also threatens it from
within,” (mā fi dawla, maā fī qanūn).198 Tourist- guidance websites warn that Abkhazia may
dangerous, while I remember in conversations people told me that sometimes they fear mafia
politics without the existence of a “state.” “They can do whatever they want and the president
cannot even do anything about it,” a Jordanian man told me during fieldwork. Others would
refer to a lack of services – no electricity, no running water in the country of over 300 lakes
and rivers- and attribute that to the lack of a “state.” As readers will take notice, I often use
the word performance when describing state practices. I use it to convey the idea that the
political (often violent) practices that we attribute to the state are in many sense ritualistic,
whether they be presidential inaugurations, government sessions, police and military
showcases of power, and even those moments when one feels the state’s gaze (checkpoints,
borders, police stations, and Mogama’s).199
I recall the italicized stores above they remind me of what we (myself and many other
state subjects) see as the “state” - sometimes embodied in the figures of the policeman, the
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parliamentary official, or even the mūkhber (informant) who isn’t always clear about his/her
secret state status. They remind me of the little moments when the state is in our minds, even
when it isn’t explicitly in our minds… when we are careful of what we say in front of whom.
It reminds of social relations that are always mixed, part and parcel of relations that are at one
and the same time also political and economic. It also reminds me of how part of the state’s
violence – in whichever form or embodiment imagined– is in how it spreads fear, suspicion
or worry, of the anxiety and doubt over what this “state” can do and when.200
Anyone can be an informant or an agent, and on the other hand, anyone can be a
traitor or a threat. This is part of how states often function in carceral manners. In fact, these
carceral manners, embodied specifically in the ways that army and police institutions (and the
officers that form them) work to uphold a god-like notion of the necessity of the existence of
the state.201 The state forms within and outside of us the belief that its existence is “sacred.”
Therefore while the “refugees” and the “undesirables” are managed inside camps on the
margins of the state, other state subjects are also maintained and managed within the state (as
though contained, especially considering the embargos that people in unrecognized states
have to deal with). In the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the presence of Russian troops
on the borders, and the “fragile” ties with Georgia make it so that neighboring, stronger states
can practice carceral state power on the two separatist regions. I mention above the notion
that states form sacredness around their existence because the idea is very telling when
considering why it is that so many groups of people around the world aspire for states, and
aspire to exist within states.
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Sovereignty and the Make-Believe:
Narmez left Syria six months ago when he was wanted for
conscription into the (Syrian) regime army, and he paid one thousand
dollars to get his name out of border patrol records and travel nīzāmy“officially”. He doesn’t want to be the reason behind a mother’s tears.

~~~
If we are to delve deeper and add Wendy Brown’s theoretical analysis on sovereignty,
states, borders and walls- ever so timely notions- we can make use of her argument that the
concept of sovereignty- is becoming “openly and aggressively rather than passively
theological.”202 Borders and walls, physical or not, are symbolic of “the imaginary intact of
nationhood” and sovereignty itself can be seen as “a peculiar border concept”.203Therefore,
whereas Hardt and Negri point to how sovereignty emerges in the service of the economic,
Brown argues that politically, sovereignty is actually “never without” theological structures
and overtones, and in that sense when “capital takes shape as an emerging global sovereign”
it becomes God-like.204Thus, while sovereignty becomes a secularized notion “for political
bearing”, it does not lose its theological structure, Brown argues as she references Hobbes
and other theorists who attribute to the sovereign a God-like aura.
Brown’s points are important in light of how we can reflect on practices of
sovereignty and the extent to which such practices are linked to statehood, which is by
extension also based on theological structures. In that sense how are we to locate the
sovereignty (or lack thereof) of unrecognized states, and how does that also point to the
waning sovereignty of the global state-system? We speak of sovereignty today as if we know
what it means, Brown tells us, yet sovereignty is “an unusually amorphous, elusive, and
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polysemic term of political life.”205 The political here also denotes the processes of
friend/enemy distinctions, and the reinforcement of ideas that “beyond the line” – the border
that separates ‘us’ from ‘them’- “force is used ruthlessly and indifferently, with indifference
to the law.”206 If we are to pose the question of why late modern subjects desires statehood,
we can also ask, as Brown does, why “do late modern subjects desire nation-state walls?”207
In part, this question can be located within Anderson’s ideas that the “imagined” nations are
imagined as sovereign and bounded. It can also be located, in line with arguments of other
scholars like Das and Navaro-Yashin, within national fantasies of containment,
impermeability, “purity, innocence and goodness.”208 I mention Narmez’s story above, in
to highlight that borders do not just operate in keeping people out, they also operate to keep
them in, a point which I delve further into in chapter three. However, Narmez’s endeavor to
cross the borders through bribery can also be reflected on in light of the discourse that sees
the state as, in part all about masārī and masālīḥ (money and interests), and borders as a
space that is “all law and no law.”209 Myths of sovereign containment gratify fantasies of
sovereign purity and innocence. Yet, sovereignty is practiced in various forms that contest
each other.210
Concluding Remarks:
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Separatist entities are feared. Recognized states and unrecognized states “do not play
together.”211 Proclamations of the non-existence of unrecognized states are usually
accompanied by widespread anxiety and unrest.212 Diplomatic fears are announced,
especially fears that this entity may strengthen ties and gain creeping legitimacy. The
academic articles I have found proposing “solutions” and “conflict resolutions” for these
unrecognized states are many. Yet other academics argue that such frameworks for
“resolving” conflicts do not account for the changing ways that sovereignty is contested,
perceived and practiced. The question I want to pose from here on is why separatism is
feared by states that are already wholly recognized? What exactly is threatening about these
spaces that seem to be both on the grid and off it at the same time?
To bring the analysis back to the “illegal” states, and the lives that are made
precarious within them (with the Syrian war-time migrants being made doubly precarious), it
is necessary to bring reflection back to “legality.” As Navaro-Yashin points out, the illegal
state is interesting because “it magnifies the international law’s support of it by default.”
What appears peculiar about this state is precisely that which “magnifies the strangeness in
‘legal’ states and in the international system itself.”213 I think Amany put nicely when once as
we talking through the issues of Abkhazia and recognition, she said that she thinks it is okay
if Abkhazia stays as is, unrecognized (without too many people knowing about it), because
that is what makes it special.

211

Bryant, Rebecca, “Living with liminality: De facto states on the threshold of the global” The Brown Journal
of World Affairs 20 (2): 125 (2014).
212
Ibid.
213
Navaro-Yashin, Yael. The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Post War Polity(North Carolina :
Duke University Press, 2012.) pg. 110

97

Wars, Broom Closets, and Structural Violence

All throughout the public spaces, Abkhazian young men who died during the Georgian-Abkhazian
war in the early 90s are commemorated. (Figure 46)

~~~

“Although few of the refugees speak Russian or Abkhaz, Chirikba said they are needed as
Abkhazia slowly rebuilds from its own war.”
“Many of them have very useful professions - electricians - we have a need of them,” he said.
“So many of them already start[ed] working, which is very good.”214
“We are trying to increase the quantity of ethnic Abkhaz living in Abkhazia,” she said, in her
office located across Freedom Square from a burned out high-rise that was the final
headquarters for Georgian soldiers here 20 years ago. "For us it's really important to
understand exactly what kind of people are moving here, what kind of relationship they have
with Abkhazia."215

“There were arm bands and belts woven of the national colors too. All for protection.
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But why did we need so much protection and what was it we were being protected
from?”216
~~~
One of the women, Maysaa, said she lives a bit far from Sukhum
because her husband is a war veteran, which meant that the commitet gave
them a house instead of renting an apartment for them. Maysaa spoke a little
about their house back in Syria. They lived in the suburbs of Damascus (reef
Dimishiq) and the terrorists raided their neighborhood after the regime’s army
“allowed them to,” or in other words, turned a blind eye, she explained. The
house that Maysaa lives in now, is too far away, and so it takes very long to get
to Sukhum, it is very boring, and it is hard to find a job and to make ends meet
in Abkhazia.
Danny Abaza is another man that my father had introduced me to.
They knew each other from those “Abaza” groups online. The first time we
met him on the street by the Black Sea, he said his mother had named him
Danny because she really liked a character named Danny in the show “Little
House on the Prairie.” Danny came to Abkhazia before, when it was still part
of the Soviet Union. In fact, he even fought in Abkhazia’s separatist war with
Georgia in 1992. Abkhazia was completely different. He described “When the
Georgians were here… this port was completely full,” as we spoke about how
small the country is. Danny was also here for the war, but he went back to
Syria immediately afterwards. He was not present for the period of strict
economic sanctions. Since then their manners have changed; they have become
more “materialistic,” he said. Later in the conversation, I learned from him that
I had actually already met his wife, Maysaa.
I would see Danny and his wife more often. I would learn from
Maysaa more details about their lives in Syria and how they had to leave their
home. She said she remembers the day really well; a few months before
leaving she got some money from her mother, who used to live in Homs. On
her way back with the money, Maysaa remembers having to hide it in her
clothes because she was afraid that the soldiers standing on the checkpoints
back to Damascus might steal the money. The strategy worked. She said she
remembered that her husband told her to save the money, in case they may
need it later, but she wanted to renovate one of the rooms in her house. And so
she renovated the room. One day, she was fasting; she took a nap in the room
to pass the time until the call to prayer, when she could break her fast. Her
short name was abruptly interrupted as her husband woke her up, and told her
that they had to take the kids and leave. They headed for Turkey. She did not
get to enjoy the room, she said one night in the Arabic café in Abkhazia, where
both she and her husband now work. Nonetheless, she added that alhamdulilah
(Thank God) she and her family were safe.

One time, in the few minutes they see each other when Maysaa
is leaving the café and Danny is just arriving for his night shift as a
guard, I asked him if he could talk to me about the war and he joked,
“Your name is jihad and you want to talk to be about war.” Then he said
that during the war, he and Mahmoud (who I do not know) had written
lā ilāha illā allāhu on bands and put them on their heads and arms. “The
Abkhaz would ask us what that was, we are Musleman (Russian for
Muslim) we told them, it gives us power… and then one Abkhaz
Christian man took one too, and then more people began to wear them”
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Danny said, adding disappointingly, “Now Daaesh and Jabhet Al-Nusra
and all of them have started wearing these things.”
~~~
In this chapter, I borrow from Povinelli’s ideas on the Aboriginal community in
Australia and I use the short piece, “The ones who walk away from Omelas” to argue that
Abkhazia is a “child in the broom closet” for Russia and Georgia. I push the argument further
to say that Syrian war-time migrants in Abkhazia, through structural violence, are thus
doubly made into a “children in the broom closet.”Agamben’s conceptualizations of “the
logic of the camp” is useful in this analysis because it allows one to think through how
certain processes of surveillance and monitoring imposed on Abkhazia (and South Ossetia)
stabilized the logic of the camp in that area.217 I argue that Abkhazia as an unrecognized
state, existing in “a state of non-existence,” also puts the neat categories of the nation-state
system to question.218 As the camp holds a status as a “space of exception,” so do
unrecognized areas, such as Abkhazia and other post-Soviet unrecognized “states.”219 In
other words, one can think of the camp as one maintained and controlled form of the “the
broom closet.”
In her short story, “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas,” Ursula Le Guin tells
us about a place called Omelas, where everyone is happy and everything is wonderful. For
the good life of the people of Omelas to continue, the misery and humiliation of a small child
confined in a broom closet must be maintained.220 The inhabitants of Omelas are aware that
their happiness is dependent on this, and it is this ethical wager that is at the center of Le
Guin’s short story. Some of the Omelas inhabitants have visited the child’s broom closet,
while others have heard stories of it when they were children. Some inhabitants reason that
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the child has become too destitute to be set free, and has become used to her condition
anyway. Others conclude that there is nothing to be done: “their tears at the bitter injustice
dry when they begin to perceive the terrible justice of reality, and to accept it.”221 A few
Omelas, one by one, to a “place even less imaginable to most of us than the city of
happiness.”222
Povinelli invites us to ask: “How do we focus attention on the broom closets of late
liberalism in the context of the spectacular machine of the killing state?”223 According to her,
the tighter we are all tied to the neoliberal market, the more gripping ethical paradoxes such
as the one Le Guin puts forth are. 224Yes, those representative of the “Omelas,” who in
Povinelli’s case of ethnographic study are the middle-class Australians, are not really living
the utopian life. Likewise, we can add that those living on the margins, and in the broom
closets of the state, are not lacking in agency in the same way that the child stuck in the closet
is.
Therefore, I want to be careful with this argument, because I don’t mean in it in the
sense that the Syrians in Abkhazia (or anywhere in the world for that matter) are sitting
around in a closet waiting for grease, or that they are stripped of their agency the way “the
child in the broom closet” is stripped of any agency in the short story. My point of departure
is therefore one that seeks to critically interrogate and/or dismantle several notions: including
the refugee, war and violence (and the modern nation-state). Notions, such as that of “war”
and “violence” are also necessary to critically examine given that one cannot look at
“refugees” in vacuum without considering the very context from which they moved. War is
also interesting to think of from another angle, when considering how notions of “the state”
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feed off of the idea of “war,” both notions become part and parcel of a rhetoric that is
constant creation and reproduction of “us/s” and “them/s.”
Povinelli points to how one can use the short story to think about our world, to look at
the conditions of clear, outright “state killing,” as well as the “more amorphous condition” of
“letting die.”225 The “letting die” usually involves the ignored or made invisible, structural
suffering of others. Most residents of Abkhazia – Syrians, Abkhazians, Armenians, and
Mingrelians suffer from the structural violence of our neoliberal modern-nation state system.
To understand state forms of killing and letting die, Povinelli says one must move into the
“nitty gritty” of the everyday, before she proceeds to give us examples of how ideas of
lethality, responsibility, and individuality exist in the social imaginations of the aboriginal
community she worked with; such ideas exist differently within the framework of states and
businesses.226Povinelli argues that the Australian security state (biopolitical regime),
alongside the neoliberal market together make-up certain late liberal attitudes towards the
various forms of living and dying. It is precisely this combination of the modern-nation state
system and the world neoliberal market that also mark the ways “divisible forms of life,
qualities, vitalities, and borders,” are produced and distributed.227 In fact, if there is one thing
that is staunchly clear about this process that the media has termed the “refugee” crisis
(sometimes more irritatingly called Europe’s migrant crisis) it is this state of “letting die,” of
indifference to Syrians and other war-time migrants drowning at sea.To think of all that have
drowned at sea, is to think all whose lives are not quite “recognized as lives.” Here it is useful
to come back to Judith Butler’s questions on frames of recognition (which are always
politically saturated), and how recognizability is to be understood.228 A policy of closing

225

Povinelli, Elizabeth. 2008. “The Child in the Broom Closet: States of Killing and Letting Die,” South Atlantic
Quarterly 107, no. 3, pp. 512
226
Ibid.
227
Ibid.
228
Ibid.

102

borders in the face of war time migration, is also a policy of “letting die,” and therefore, also
a policy of killing.
A lot of Povinelli’s focus within the idea of “letting die” centers around the disease,
poverty, and other forms of structural violence present in the spaces in which aboriginal
people are concentrated. This focus resonated greatly with a piece I read on Abkhazia,
written in a UK medical journal. The journalist quotes Abkhazian president Seregi Bagapsh:
“How do we get drugs to treat our people?” he asks. “If you want the honest answer: we
bring them in as contraband or on ships from Turkey. There’s no other way.”229 For
approximately a decade after its war with Georgia, Abkhazia struggled from an economic
embargo, imposed by the European Union.230 The fact that until 2008 it was unrecognized by
any country in the world did not help. The rest of Parfitt’s short report concentrates on the
condition of the Abkhazian healthcare system after a decade-long embargo, when it had
previously been part of a centralized Soviet health care system to begin with. In my fieldwork
conversations I had heard complaints from the Syrians on the healthcare system inside
Abkhazia; this system (or lack thereof) was different from what they had been used to in
Syria.231 I have heard stories (maybe rumors) of how Abkhazian people would go to the
doctors with leg pains, and doctors amputate the leg, when there could have been other
solutions. Later on in the fieldwork when sitting with Syrian women, I would also often hear
comments about how if one of children breaks an arm, or if anything were to happen, it
would be best to go to a hospital in Sochi, Russia rather than in Abkhazia. This is only one
example of the “letting die” is enforced on such places in the world, and the 10-yearembargo, and later more sanctions, took its toll on the people of territory in other ways.
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For the rest of the chapter I attempt to weave together the theoretical background and
skeleton which holds up why the aforementioned notions should be problematized and how
we can look at them more critically, as well as why I found it useful in my analysis to do so.
Furthermore, there is brief historical background on Abkhazia and the Northern Caucasus, as
well as brief snippets of the ethnographic material which I collected from my fieldwork and
which I aim to look and think through on the basis of a theoretical bulk of knowledge. As
mentioned in the introduction, I depend on people’s accounts and narratives greatly as
primary sources. Narratives can invoke the violence of state rituals and their transcendence
into the everyday. Peoples’ recollections, regardless of “accuracy,” as Veena Das reminds us
“ascribe to the half hidden state apparatus as an authorial center, a visible place from which
its aggressive authority emanates.”232

Camps, Spaces of Exception and Broom Closets:

Using the lens of Le Guin and Povinelli, we can think of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
Georgia’s other break-away region as “broom closets.” There are similar “spatializations of
exception,” and they include Guantanamo Bay, the U.S. Mexico border, and post- 2003 war
Iraq, for example.233 This is in addition to the similar cases of post-Soviet spaces that have
declared their alleged independence without any recognition, including Trans-Dniester in
Moldova and Nagorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan/Armenia.
In Agamben’s notes on “the logic of the camp,” he writes that the camp “is the space
that is opened when the state of exception becomes the rule.”234 The camp thus holds its
status as a “space of exception,” and the place in which “the absolute condito inhumana that
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has ever existed on earth was ever realized.”235 The camp is presented, to refugees
especially, as an “emergency measure,” as something “temporary,” while at one and the same
time it still strikingly takes hold of the everyday, and becomes routine. Yet, the refugee
camp, in its specific logic as a device of control, operates in intimate relation to what Liisa
Malkki calls the “national order of things.”236 The very premise that refugees are “problems
of organization,” and the very notion of displacement as implying emplacement, or a proper
place for people to belong, are conjugations of a robustly national logic. 237
In “Documenting Territory: Passportisation, Territory, and Exception in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia,” Vincent Artman compares Abkhazia, and South Ossetia to “the camp,” as
Agamben theorized it. “Abkhazia and South Ossetia today exist in a state of non-existence,”
Artman writes.238 Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia are unrecognized by all of the world’s
international organizations and nation-states, except for a handful. Georgia, with the backing
of the European Union and the United Nations, maintains that these are areas that it has only
“temporarily” lost control over. Only Russia, and shortly after, Nicaragua and Venezuela,
have until now, officially recognized Abkhazia and South Osseita as independent states. This
is also while Russian troops are present on (all of) Abkhazia’s borders, and while it maintains
the economic and political upper-hand in the area. Amany likened Russia’s grip and carcreal
powers over Abkhazia to French imperialism and colonialism over Syria- iste’mar iqtesady w
seyasey (political and economic colonialism).
Artman’s argument lies in Russia’s mass distribution of Russian passports to the
people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which he argues stabilized the logic of exceptional
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spaces and the logic of the camp. Mainstream interpretations of Russia’s move stopped at the
point that the mass transformation of these two populations into Russian citizens symbolized
an almost annexation of these two pieces of land from Georgia. However, Artman argues that
the process symbolized, in fact, more than just that. It symbolized a generalized logic of the
camp within these two areas, and I argue that, by extension the later processes of mass
production and distribution of Abkhazian (and South Ossetian) passports also stabilized the
logic of the camp.
Upon their arrivals to Abkhazia, the first to groups of Syrians were made to stay in
two “hotels” temporarily, until they could be given apartments. Usually, the idea the word
“hotels” rings with us positively, and gives the impression that they were given exceptionally
good treatment. However, during interviews they clarified that yes this place was called a
hotel, but was kteer saye’ (really bad), and wesekh (dirty). The food was gross, and the juice
had ants in it, the food situation was so bad that the Syrian women wanted to take over the
cooking [for the hotel]. In addition, the hotel/former living space of UN “peace” troops that
were charged with overlooking the Abkhazian-Georgian conflict. Amany took me there
because she thought that it would be important for my fieldwork. As we walked to the
“hotel”, after a long bus ride, she spoke about how difficult it was for them to be there at the
beginning of their stay in Abkhazia. Because it was so far away, it was very difficult for
people to get to the marketplace for food; bathrooms were shared, and the spaces and rooms
were very small. The ex-UN peace keeping mission site turned hotelis behind (and linked) to
an actual hotel called Atyara. This information is relevant because, while the Syrians in
Abkhazia never had to stay in camps per se, and while this is one of the primary reasons
many of them chose to continue living there, they were still sent to the outskirts of the city
and still concentrated in specific spots. And according to official rhetoric, they had stayed in
“hotels.” The Syrians in Abkhazia are no longer staying in these hotels, but they are
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constantly put into a place of uncertainty regarding what will happen with their apartments.
Apartment owners always want their apartments back for the summer seasons, because
tourists will always pay more than the commitet can. At different points in time, the commitet
tells people that they must start depending on themselves for apartment payments. In
addition, while there are, admittedly many Syrians who are in Sukhum, there are also many
that were made to reside in much farther away, more rural-like places such as Gagra, and
Dranda.
Michel Agier reminds us that camps are created on the margins of nation-states to
keep out “the undesirables.” Whether or not there is a camp involved, refugees are more often
than not bounded under what Agier calls “police and military mentalities of separation and
confinement.”239We can thus think of the camp and a sort of “spatialization of violence.”240
The “undesirables” are not only just that, they are also the “precarious lives,” the children in
the broom closet, they are lives that are not worthy of living and can be let die. They are not
exceptional aspect of the nation-state system, but rather they exist because of that very
system and the many forms of violence that it perpetuates. In another sense, such
unrecognized states, deemed artificial, pseudo-states, or ‘non-state’ states, are at the essence
of this very system.241
Relevant Historical Background:

The analysis I hope to present in this thesis, necessitates a problematziation and
deconstruction of the category of “war.”Das writes that her research led her to begin thinking
of the social “in terms of unfinished stories.”242 In a similar sense, we can also begin to think
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of war in terms of unfinished stories. While, in history books, many wars are associated with
start and end dates; war as a social project cannot easily have boundaries drawn around it and
thinking only in terms of “events” that end and begin may not always be useful.243
Furthermore, the selection of memories from past events plays a role in the creation of the
future. In this project, a mixture of historical and contemporary “violent events” is relevant;
the Circassian genocide, the Abkhazian-Georgian war, and the contemporary Syrian war.244
Looking at how narratives surrounding these three “events” mesh and work together further
invites us to think of war in a “continuum” (rather than simply thinking of war and peace
dichotomies).245
To think of war differently, or more critically, entails moving away from popular, or
more mainstream, ideas of war as an inherent “bad” that confronts “peace,” the ideal “good.”
However, as Richards argues, analyses of war as simply “bad” and disorderly (as opposed to
an inherently “good” and orderly peace) often take war out of its social context. War is then
thought of and imagined as a “thing in itself” instead of analyzed as “one social project
against many competing social projects.”246 He argues that instead of quarantining war as a
“disease,” one should “try instead to grasp its character as but one among many different
phases or aspects of social reality.”247 With this in mind, war can also be a state of mind
shared by many participants while “peace” is often more violent than war.248
Throughout my fieldwork period, and especially earlier when my father was still with
me, my father and I would sit at a Turkish food cart that sold halal meat and alcohol by the
sea. We would sit with a Turkish man who spoke Arabic because he worked in Saudi Arabia
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for seven years of his life, and with an Abkhazian man who, before the war, had lived in
(actually) Georgian territory. During the war, this man came back to the Abkhazian territories
to fight. According to the narrative that he had provided, an ethnically- “Georgian” Stalin
“gave Abkhazia to Georgia.” The fact that such a narrative exists is very telling,and the story
he recited was a popular one because I heard it several times later throughout my fieldwork
and often from Syrians. Meanwhile, one must bear in mind that Stalinist policy of repression
hit Abkhazia just as it hit the rest of the Soviet Union.
Zverev writes that in March 1921, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia was
proclaimed and lasted until December 1921 when a treaty of Union bound the SSR of
Abkhazia to a Georgian SSR. This lasted until 1931, when the Abkhazian Republic was
“incorporated into Georgia,” but still with relative autonomy.249 From the late 1930s to the
1950s, a policy of Georgianization was underway, including a plan of Georgian resettlement
into the territory.250 According to interlocutor accounts, this policy also meant that the
Abkhaz were not allowed to speak their language.
An Abkhaz assembly in the village of Lykhny first proposed that Abkhazia secede
from Georgia on March 18th 1989; the participants of the assembly included 30,000 people,
five thousand of whom were not Abkhaz (Armenians, Greek, Russians, etc.).251 Meanwhile
Georgia, “informal movements” expressed outrage at the Abkhazian demands, and while the
Georgian outrage was first expressed in the form of anti-Abkhaz slogans, it later acquired a
general pro-independence [from the Soviet Union] character. After weeks of demonstrations
[including hunger strikes] against Abkhazian separatism, and later for Georgian
independence, on April 9th, 1989, Russian Soviet troops made their way into Rustaveli
Avenue in Tbilisi where a group of people were protesting in front of the Georgian
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government building.252 The troops killed at least 20 of the protesters, most of whom were
young women, with sharpened digging tools and toxic gas.253 One year later, on April 9th,
1990, Georgia wrote its declaration of independence. 254 This, the break-up of the Soviet
Union, South Ossetia’s war with Georgia, and the autonomist movement in the rest of the
North Caucuses further complicated the situation. According to a book called Ayaayra,
meaning “victory” in Abkhaz language, the “first airstrikes” took place on August 14th,
1992.255 According to Zverev, the most immediate support that Abkhazia had came from the
North Caucasus where meetings under the slogan “Hands off Abkhazia!” took place. The
meetings were held in North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Circasiia, and in
Chechnya. 256 Men such as Shamil Basaev, a Chechen militant, helped lead military guerillas
in Abkhazia, and more broadly fought against Russian domination in the region. By 1994, the
Abkhaz parliament had declared itself an independent state, while turmoil continued closeby, primarily in Chechnya.
Interestingly enough, people from various other states, who have a real and imagined
link to a “diaspora” of Abkhaz, or Circassians, or North Caucasus residency, also have a
place in this story of war. This includes holders of Turkish, Jordanian, and Syrian
nationalities but that claim Abkhazian “origins.”257Soner Gogua, for example, is a Turkish
man who went to fight in Abkhazia when the war began. He was one of the fighters under the
lead of Shamil Basaev.K haldun Abaza is a Jordanian man who also went to fight in
Abkhazia, married an Abkhazian woman, and continued his life in the country. Danny Abaza
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also fought in Abkhazia when he was in his 20s, but went back to Syria after the war was
over. Twenty years later, a war in Syria led him back to Abkhazia.
~~~
I met Lara by the giant white statue and we walked to the beach and sat on its
pebbled shore. I cannot remember the order of the conversation, but we spoke
about many things: Abkhazia, Germany, Syria, and the sharkas. Her husband
has been asking her: do you want to go to Germany. She’s been telling him:
“No I don’t want to … you’ll still learn a new language?” And then there is the
same hassle of having to look for a job, she said. If all the Syrians are now
going to Germany, this means that the job market is going to be even more
competitive; it will be even harder to find a job. If she’s going to move
anywhere, she might as well be going back to el sham, she added. The only
problem with Damascus is that everything there is very expensive now… here
they can buy more things with the money that they have. In Syria diapers had
been some hundred liras and now they are in the thousands… milk had cost
around 20 liras and now it costs over hundred, she listed the insanely high
prices.
Larisa’s mother, brother and sister were here before she was, They were the
ones that encouraged her to come, but then her sister wanted to get married and
her groom had been waiting for her, so they went back. Her brother went back
too, and now he has to go into the regime’s army after he had somehow fled
from it when he was here (in Abkhazia), but now he has no other option and
must go into the army. I asked Larisa why her brother doesn’t just try to do
illegally migrate and escape, and she told me, because that means he will never
be able be able to go back to Syria and who knows what God has written,
maybe he will want to go back to Syria. Anyway, she explained that in all
cases they were going to get in touch with someone they know in the army so
that they can place him somewhere where there is not much happening, so that
he can also stay close to their neighborhood. The military man they know is
Waleed Abaza, if you have heard of him, she told me. There’s also a man
named Mamdooh Abaza, who was killed.
They were both involved with the killing of the terrorists in the Hama events;
the terrorists from the Muslim Brotherhood, she said when I asked. Both his
(Waleed’s) sons have died; one of them is a very scary shabīḥa who does not
know mercy. She said he killed himself while playing the game of death.
What’s the game of death? It’s when there is a rifle with seven or six spaces for
bullets, but only one bullet. It’s like a dare that you will not be brave enough to
shoot. The chances that you will shoot the bullet are less, but with his luck, he
shot the bullet. He went into a comma for three days and died.
Lara recalled another story. “One time the Alawis attacked our alley at 5 am,”
she said. The Circassian alley was between an Alwai alley and an area that had
been under the control of the FSA. So what had happened was that the FSA
occupied place threw a grenade at the Alawi alley and then the Alawis thought
it was the sharkas that had thrown it. They came into the alley with their
rūsseyāt and their guns. At the time, Lara’s kids had been sleeping they had to
wake them up and their father passed them on to their uncles over the roof. The
scare did not last long, thankfully, Lara said. There was a man in their alley
who told them that those were sharkas and that the sharakas have nothing to
do with anything.
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“We’re not with anyone, we’re with the khūbz, bread, and neither one of these
parties is going to give me a house and a car,” Lara explained. “They are both
only after sūltā, authority … it is a struggle over sūltā.”
~~~

I walked with Maryam and her daughter Sinamis, by far one of the cutest little
girls I have ever seen, down the promenade to the bus stop where they planned
to ride back to their home in Novi Rayon, which is a bit further off from
Sukhum. Sina ran after a dog and shouted something back at her mother. I did
not understand and when I looked back at her mother for an explanation, she
told me that Sina’s dog hung himself at the time fighting entered their
neighborhood. How, I asked. He was on the roof, on a leach, and during the
fighting they could not go get him; he jumped off the building. They had a
house not an apartment, she explained. Moments before, Sina was telling her
mother and I that Abkhazia sucks. We laughed and she got embarrassed and
told us to stop.

War and el khūbz (‘the bread’):
As with the aforementioned categories of the “refugee” and the “camp,” we have
preconceived images and ideas of what “war” looks like. Many academic studies and most
journalistic coverage of wartime experiences focus only the acute moments of dramatic
violence. They focus on the moments that involve guns, barrel bombs, explosions, beatings,
rape, and the list can go on. Such moments come with very felt, real consequences and
While, focusing on such moments or analyzing them is important and may not be problematic
in and of itself per se, focusing only on staunching physical violence misses other important
aspects of wartime, and renders them unimportant. These other aspects may have even
greater implications for wartime inhabitants but they are not sensational enough for coverage.
There are other forms of more mundane, repetitive and routine types of structural violence.
These everyday experiences on the economic and social landscapes of wartime
reconfigurations are viewed as unremarkable because they are part and parcel of everyday
life, but they are “ultimately far more deadly,” for the very same reason.258 They are also the
wartime issues that may affect people the most, and the conventional “overemphasis on acute
258
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violence,” comes at the expense of this structural violence. And structural violence is
important to the understanding of these moments of severe physical violence precisely
because these moments are when the preexisting social conflict in amplified and made more
visible. Structural violence constitutes the social conditions of war. Thus wars are not just
military endeavors, they are ultimately social phenomena.259
Lubkemann’s proposition to study war as a “social condition” is also useful for this
project, since I am looking at two separate “wars.” Therefore, it is important to study how
certain social relations are realized and transformed in times of war. How is war thus “a
transformative social condition?”260 And how does reducing to only a violent condition
obscure other aspects of life during war? As Lubkemann would put it, how are “culturally
scripted life projects” enacted? Lara, for instance, narrated multiple violent instances some of
which are not even written above. She herself had been put in near-death situations. For
example, she told me that she was talking to her mother on the phone one evening when a
bullet ripped through the wall of one side of the room into the other side. Yet, after and
within this stream of stories, she is most of all concerned with el khubz, or with food and
livelihood.
It is primarily for this reason that I appreciate Lubkemann’s proposal that
anthropologists most on to different, less pervasive ways of studying war and displacement
and of looking at wartime migration as part of war as “a social condition.” By analyzing war
as a social condition, as more than just acute moments of physical violence, and of wartime
migration as part and parcel of this, one can begin to ask deeper questions on the “complex
multidimensional agenda of social struggles.”261 It is not refugees alone that begin to be seen
and represented as bare life but in fact, all warscape inhabitants become seen as “stripped
down humanity.”
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The next point of Lara’s stories that I would like to reflect on is her casual, arbitrary,
and ambiguous use of ethnic, sectarian, and other categories. They also reveal the point that
these categories are mushy. Again, I am keen to deconstruct ethnicity, as I have done in the
earlier chapter, not just because of the stereotypes imposed and practiced on Eastern Europe
(where my interlocutors have gone) but also because of the Middle East (where my
interlocutors have left) that is also stereotyped as a region of endemic primordial, ethnic, and
religious violence. This point will come up again in the next chapter, because it pertains to
wars and the simplistic reasons provided for them. As Ussama Makdisi argues, the
sectarianism that is now such a main feature in studies of the region is an outcome of national
politics and the creation of states rather than an ever-present problem preceding the creation
of states in the Middle East.262 Sectarianism is also quite largely an effect of the state and
nation building processes. Communal violence is a modern phenomenon and, through this
type of violence, bodies of individuals become “metamorphosed” into the (ethnic, sectarian,
or other) categories for which they are supposed to stand. Ethnic and religious determinacy
is thus inscribed into initially less stable and less clear cut social fields and categories.
Concluding Remarks:
Earlier, I stated the argument that Syrians in Abkhazia are doubly “children in the
broom closet.” One of the biggest evidences to this, as well as one of the biggest silences in
Abkhazia and throughout fieldwork was that of access to Sochi, Russia. I heard about this
early on during fieldwork from a Swiss anthropologist, and later in a conversation with
Rahma at her apartment. Rahma and I had been talking about the commitet, where passports
are made. We were talking about Syria, the Syrian regime, money, Egypt, and Sherief
Abaza.” The point of the conversation was not that Syrians were not allowed into Sochi, the
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point of the conversation was money. Rahma told me of a Syrian woman, who came to
Abkhazia and had some money. After her arrival, she realized, much like many others, that
she hated it. She wanted to leave. But at that time, it was 2014 during the Sochi Olympics.
“And you know how Syrians weren’t allowed across the borders during the Olympics?” she
said midst the anecdote. She went on, the Syrian woman went to the commitet, and told
Sherief she wants to leave. He said no, it is impossible for a Syrian to cross the border now.
“She was wearing a diamond necklace that costs a million liras; she took it off and put it on
his desk. The next morning she was out,” Rahma said.
After reading and reflecting on “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas,” this story
that Rahma had told me came to mind. The story had been on my mind before, and it was one
of the stories that had made an impact on me, especially when considering my own
experiences crossing the Russian borders into Abkhazia also as an Arab. Yet, I reflected on it
differently after having read the short story. Is Russia “hiding” the children in the broom
closet? Was this outright racist policy related to Russia’s already problematic relationship
with the Circassians (the ones living in Russia)? Is it because the Syrians in Abkhazia are
also Circassians? And when I asked Rahma why this policy had even been there during that
time, she didn’t know? Why no one seemed to dwell on it was also a question that came to
mind. According to various media reports, ethnic Circassians had been protesting the
Olympics, because these Olympics were being held in Sochi, a city where Russian expansion
took place through genocide of the Circassians.263We have learned that nation-states are more
often than not created on massacres and genocides; Russia was created on the ashes of a
Circassian genocide.264
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The “national order of things,” as we live through it today makes clear to us that
violence is on a continuum and that a neoliberal capitalist nation-state system makes sure this
violence is reproduced.265 The “violence order of things” makes clear to us that “wars” do not
begin and end when officials say they begin and end, wars are not confined to borders, and
inhabiting a war (or several wars) is not limited to the moments of clear physical violence.266
There is violence embedded in our classifications and our categories. There is violence in
places that we have never heard of, and there is violence in the places and spaces we inhabit
everyday; spaces and places that the othered are kept from inhabiting and moving through.
We – readers and myself, inhabitants of worlds other than closets – are left to ponder our
complicity, to wonder and ponder on what is beyond the Omelas and the broom closets,
where the ones who walk away go, “I cannot describe it all.” Le Guin writes, “It is possible
that it does not exist. But they seem to know where they are going, the ones who walk away
from Omelas.”267
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Making passports, creating citizens: on document-production in Abkhazia

An Abkhazian government employee tells us about passport procedures. (Figure 46)

“Border policing is a ritualistic performance. When the failures of the deterrence effort
led to a performance crisis, the performers save by promising a bigger and better show…
And in the case of immigration control, the crackdown on illegal crossings along the
most visible stretches of the border has erased politically embarrassing images of chaos
and replaced them with comforting images of orders.”268
“The Costaguanians would buy forged immigration papers although, truth to tell, it
was not easy to see any difference between doing that and the even more common
procedure of ‘buying’ non-forged papers from State officials bribed with the ‘tarifa
extraoficil’ or peaje.
Like the official and the “extra- official,” the true and the forged were flip-sides of
stately being; neither could exist without the other and this strategic confusion,
together with the mystery therein, was dramatically magnified at the border dividing
the two republics. What do we mean by dramatically magnified? We mean a ritual,
but more precisely a literalization, as if staged, of the mystique of sovereignty.”269
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Amany’s brother Owis was stopped at the Moscow airport for hours before
airport security finally allowed him to board the plane. “This is what happens
when you have a Syrian passport now”, his sister Amany explained. Owis, an
orthopedic doctor, was having a difficult time moving on with his career in
Abkhazia, where the healthcare system is already crippled by over a decade of
embargo and a lack of funds. The plan was that he would go to Turkey, and
from there take a boat across the sea to Greece, where he would begin moving
up to Holland. There, career prospects would be brighter, Amany explained.
But now, Amany, separated from her husband three years ago, has to attend to
all of her four children’s needs without the help of her brother. Amany is
“Circassian” but her former husband is “Arab,” which means that her children
are “Arab” and cannot get their Abkhazian citizenship and passports in a
matter of months like everyone else. This also means that other aspects of their
lives, like enrollment in schools and daycare centers, and eventually also
travel, will be more of hassle to attend to.
Amany’s sister, who is married to an Englishman never has trouble and
airports, a fact that she knows and both she and her sister bring up. She had
trouble with entry to Abkhazia and within renewing her Russian visa. It’s
strange, she says, because it’s a British passport, she says, but it is probably
because Russia does not want Abkhazia to have access to too many people
from outside.
~~~
We walked for two minutes until we reached the Abkhazian border, “the nicest
border you will ever pass through,” my father said poking fun at how difficult
it is to travel while Arab these days. A middle-aged Abkhazian soldier was
sitting on the Abkhazian side; he looked at my Egyptian passport and my
online Abkhazian visa, and reminded me that I should go get my paperwork
done when I get to Sukhum. Unrecognized as an “international border” by
Georgia, the Georgian-Abkhazian border is much more militarized than the
Russian-Abkhazian border.270 The Syrians who journeyed to Abkhazia have
also crossed in through Russia rather than Georgia.
On our way “outside” of Russia and into Abkhazia, Russian border patrol
interrogated my father and I about our reasons for visiting Abkhazia. Where
did we intend to stay? How long? And what about our lives back in Egypt?
The Russian border guards now even know that I study Anthropology at the
American University in Cairo. Most of the others passing through were
Russian tourists, fewer were Armenians and Abkhaz, but who were probably
residents rather than tourists. I think my father and I looked like tourists,
although not the kind they are used to. Some Abkhaz women tried to rent out
their apartments to us as soon as they saw us. They even waited for us on until
we were done getting interrogated.

~~~
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Enrollment in schools, access to the official labor force, access to healthcare, access
to money [banks], movement, as well as various other matters now considered life rituals
depend on and are dictated by documents and identification paperwork that, whether
available or not, often strip people of their livelihoods. People stand in lines to get documents
that “prove” their health, or their clear criminal record (fīsh w tashbīh in Egypt), or to codify
their “skills” before they can formally enter the workforce. When we are born, our (parental)
guardians have to prove our existence with a birth certificate that we must then carry around
for the rest of our lives. Depending on which state you happen to be born in, your birth
certificate may include information such as your parents’ names, your place of birth, religion,
and gender; categories that, years later, may also determine your life chances and often your
mobility and access to certain spaces. Later you will be numbered with identification cards
that also carry with them a set of categories that you are said to embody. Finally, all of the
above maintains that you are under the eye of the state. Bureaucracy exists not primarily to
facilitate subjects’ transactions with the state, but it exists to also cripple individuals’ daily
prospect, someone in Egypt once told me, meaning these things hold back peoples’ interests.
If at any point in your lifetime these papers do not exist, then you may be considered
“stateless”… or “illegal” and illegible to the state.
This chapter invites readers to think of the passport and other identification
documents as contentious (and repressive) because they dictate citizenships which in part
dictate access to places and to mobility (among other things). Documents are toolsof control
that play a central role in producing various particular textures of relationships between
people and states, as Tobias Kelly puts it.271 This chapter also explores what passports and
other identification documents represent in people’s everyday lives as paperwork (and the
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lack thereof) remains central to people’s life chances.272 The color of a passport is also one of
the determining factors of lives that matter and lives that do not. In other words it identifies
the “undesirables”; it identifies those that are grieve-able, and those who can be left to die.273
In the following pages I (again) uphold the argument that paradoxically, passport production
in Abkhazia reasserts the globalized (dominant) system of, modern nation-state but also
highlights how problematic, fragile, and performative that system is.
Navaro-Yashin, for example, also speaks about the affective lives of unrecognized
documents in Northern Cyprus coining the term “make-believe documents.”274By inviting
Derrida’s thought into her work, she argues that both the copy and the original are fake and
deconstructs the notion of the document altogether.275In all cases,passports are a cornerstone
of surveillance and control, and are central to governance, but the fact that there are those of
contend and knowingly produce internationally unrecognized passports can tell us something
significant about a system that creates both “stateless” peoples and an aura of the necessity of
documents.276
In Seeing Like a State James Scott demonstrates how states attempt to make societies
“legible,” which is one of the purposes documents serve.277 Passports and identity
documentations form another dimension of a simplification process that seeks to arrange the

272

Ibid.
This is also exemplified by international and local media choice of those who deserve more news coverage
than others. (Often determining news-worthiness based on victims’ nationalities; this brings forth questions of
why our politics of sympathy is constructed the way it is.) Egyptian prisons are exemplary of this idea of
identifying who matters and who does not based on passports. While everyone in Egypt’s prisons is likely to be
subjected to horrendous treatment, (most) of those with dual nationality have (at least) the option to renounce
their Egyptian nationalities in exchange for release.
274
Navaro-Yashin, Yael. The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Post War Polity(North Carolina :
Duke University Press, 2012.) pg 114.
275
Brinkley makes a similar argument in his study of hand-copyists in Yemen when he says that “the copy may
take on the original.”See: Messick, Brinkley Morris. The calligraphic state: Textual domination and history in a
Muslim society ( Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993)
273

276

As I explained earlier, as different sites of power and states throughout the world cooperate it becomes
difficult to speak of one place in vacuum, without speaking of others. Thus, I will be making references to
Egypt, Syria, Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia, throughout the following analysis.
277
Scott, James. C. Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed.
(London;New Haven;: Yale University Press, 1998;1999;). .

120

population in ways that facilitate classical state functions. It is a process of state-craft that
seeks an “administratively more convenient format.”278 Historically, this process included the
creation of permanent last names, the standardization of language and a legal discourse, and
the establishment of cadastral surveys and population registers.279
With this starting point in mind, this chapter also investigates how the manufacturing
of documents and passports becomes a “state activity,” or an essential trait that marks the
“state-ness” of states.280Navaro-Yashin puts it perfectly when she says: “Documents are
among the primary paraphernalia of modern states and legal systems: They are its material
culture. A ‘wannabe’ state has to produce documents to look and act like other states.”281In
the following chapter, the question of how passports, documents, and paperwork are
navigated by both people and states is a central one. I begin by recounting my own
experiences with accessing the field. Then, I proceed to bring in examples of what paperwork
had meant for the people living in Abkhazia at large, and for the Syrian community there
more specifically. How do these documents make their ways into the very personal everyday
practices of people? What kind of social and political status do such documents lead? In other
words, I ponder these themes of documentation, passportization, borders, and control of
movement by looking at my own experiences obtaining documents and crossing borders, at
the production of largely unrecognized Abkhazian passports, and finally (and most
importantly) the specific stories regarding paperwork and documents that I have heard whilst
conducting fieldwork with Circassian-Syrians in Abkhazia.
Theorizing Bureaucracy:
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Scholars who theorize the state, have tended also to theorize bureaucracy, as one often
visualizes images of large bureaucratic centers as one of the many embodiments of “the
state.”282 Gramsci, for example, considers bureaucracy, which usually constitutes a compact
body, is the most dangerous conservative force. Weber, on the other hand, sees large-scale
bureaucracy as alleviating exploitation; it is the state’s “rational” and legal authority.
Bureaucrats’ access to information can lead to corruption, Weber admits, but a strong
parliament can put a check on the amount of power bureaucrats hold.283 Marx calls
bureaucracy the "formal state spirit," and the actual spiritless-ness of the state. For Marx,
bureaucracy takes itself “to be the ultimate purpose of the state.”284 He writes that through
bureaucracy: “state objectives are transformed into objectives of the department and
department objectives into objectives of the state.”285 This bureaucracy is “a circle from
which no one can escape.”286
Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptualization of the state and his essay on how one can re-think
the state’s bureaucratic field, among other state entities and manifestations, is a useful one for
this project.287 The endeavor of thinking the state is often accompanied with the risk of
applying the very categories of thought produced and guaranteed by the state to our social
world. Hence one risks misrecognizing both these categories and “the state.” Taken-for
granted categories, which include “sex,” “age,” “skills” are reproduced through
bureaucracy.288 These notions, which make their way into the realm of obviousness, are part
and parcel of symbolic production, which he says is where “one feels the grip of the state
most powerfully.”289 Bureaucracy portrays itself as a ‘universal group’ working with a
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universal awareness in mind or that it is a “rational instrument” charged with realizing the
general interest. 290
Yet Bourdieu tells us that state bureaucracies and their representatives “are great
producers of ‘social problems’ and of the symbolic order. They reproduce the state’s own
system of classifications, constraints, corporeal and mental discipline, which is imposed
“uniformly on all agents.” As part of the perform-ative discourse of the state, bureaucracy
and its agents make decisive contributions “to the production and reproduction of instruments
of construction of social reality.” This is important, because as he reminds us, “the most
brutal relations of force are always simultaneously symbolic relations.”291 State agents,
Bourdieu tells us, give “a universal form of expression” to their vested interests “an in
elaborating a theory of public service and public order.”292 For the sake of this project, it is
important to add national categories to the list of categories and classifications that states
invent and impose.
~~~
Abkhazia does not grant the Abkhazian nationality to the Mingrelians living in
the South, and some of the still use their Soviet passports. It can only be
utilized for movement around the region only though. A week into my
fieldwork I know that a silence exists around the 200,000 Georgians living in
Abkhazia that were forced to leave, and there is no granting Armenians
nationality.
Shereen says that the Abkhaz have a nice opportunity for agreement with
Russia. The government wants more and more cooperation with Russia… but
the people do not. They don’t like to take risks, Shereen says… they think this
means Russia will occupy them. Well, everyone knows that Russia is the one
that’s really in control anyway, and besides, if they wanted to could do so in
twenty minutes. This could actually be good for the economy, Shereen adds. It
would also be so much better for us because we would have the Russian
passport and then we can go anywhere in the world that we want. The Abkhaz
don’t care, they already use the Russian passport anyway, she continues and I
agree with her.

~~~
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Research, Mogama’ and access to other states:

Abkhazia was not planned. Initially, the plan had been to study two field sites, Turkey
and Egypt; two states that are not on good terms at the moment. I chose to study the
narratives of memories of Syria in Egypt and Turkey is order to answer the question: how
might narratives differ according to locality? The fact that after July 2013 many of the
Syrians in Egypt had stated that it would be better for them to go to Syria Turkey?than
remain in Egypt, where they are also subjected to various forms of violence, had inspired this
question. An increasing number of Syrians began leaving Egypt, and while many were
heading to Europe, many Syrians preferred to go to Turkey over Egypt. States hold within
their provinces the ability to increase restrictions on departure as well as arrivals, and this
fieldwork has demonstrated that restrictions on departure are increasingly the case in states
such as Egypt and Syria. It is on the interests of such states to undermine departure for
various reasons, usually pertaining to military interests and strengthening the military labor
force, or to prevent people (or members of the opposition) to propagandize against the state’s
regime abroad.293
Due the unpleasantness of an Egyptian passport, Turkey was an inaccessible field site.
After at least four or five trips back and forth from Egypt’s bureaucratic center, Mogama’ my
field of destination changed to Abkhazia. The prospect of fieldwork in Turkey dwindled with
each trip back from downtown, where both the Turkish embassy and Mogama’ are located.
On my first trip to Mogama’ I asked about the regulations that I would have to go through in
order to obtain a security approval that was previously a requirement for young men only.
The police officer wouldn’t answer me until I had a visa on my passport first. I went to the
Turkish embassy, applied for a tourist visa because I had no institutional backing in Turkey
293
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that would allow me to apply for a different type of visa, and approximately a week later, I
went back to Mogama’, to room number fifteen on the second floor, to ask once again about
the security approval. That time, there were more people standing in line. I overheard one
man asking about a security approval to go to Jerusalem, and another woman complaining
about how she missed her flight at the airport because she doesn’t have a security approval.
“But I have a residency permit and I am living in Libya,” I heard her say. By the time I got to
the window, with a visa in my passport as they had asked the first time, the disinterested
woman at the window looked at my passport, then looked back at me and asked: “are you
traveling alone or with your father?” I was planning on travelling alone, but because I was
unsure if that was the correct answer, I told her I didn’t know. “A girl alone with a tourist
visa doesn’t get to travel,” she said. Why, I asked… awamer “Orders,” she answered. She
would only hand me an application I was travelling with my father. This rule is only for
Turkey. Why I asked her again, “orders” she responded again.
The last time I went to Mogama’ was with my father, a fact which only increased the
stressful-ness of the experience. In this tiny room number fifteen, there are six windows. Two
for people who are waiting and getting called upon to receive their papers of travel approval,
two for refugee affairs, and two windows for those who, like myself, were waiting to fill out
applications requesting travel security approvals and clearances. Egyptian citizens and
refugees, from all over Egypt were all expected to go to room 15 on the second floor of
Mogama’. The room was so crowded it was hard to breathe. People yelled, argued, and
joked.
The most disturbing moment of the entire experience was when police officers told
the government workers to stop working until we “organized” ourselves. The police officers
stood at the other side of the glass window, staring back as people toppled over each other.
The government workers stopped working. The officers told them not to work until people
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organize themselves. “Why are you doing that?” people asked. “eḥna benmūt” (we are
dying) I remember hearing someone say. Obviously none of the police officers bothered
answering. People managed to laugh and make fun of the dramatic coldness of the officers
midst the mob-like crowdedness of the room. Standing in line, one could hear all kinds of
stories revolving around these security approvals. For example, you instantly get your
approval if you have a European Schengen visa or a U.S. visa on your passport. “Because if
you’ve been to Europe or to the U.S. then there’s no need to worry about you,” one guy
standing in line said poking fun at the whole process.
By the time I miraculously got to the window, I could feel the marble of that little
piece of table in front of the window piercing into my stomach, because that is how crowded
it was. I got my application and made my way out of what was probably the most crowded
room I had ever seen in my life in order to fill it out. After filling the out the application and
getting back in line, the police officer standing at the window scribbled all over it. “Go write
a profession and come back” he said as he stared at some other papers on his desk. I didn’t go
back. Yet the consequences of having a Turkish visa on my passports.
The most disappointing thing about the new travel approval regulations was that they
singled out the countries that had previously been the easiest for Egyptians to go to. So that
now, you not only had to worry about convincing the country of destination that you don’t
intend on making a permanent migration of that country for travel, but now also had one has
to convince the authorities of one’s own country. The security clearance regulations are
justified under the idea that they keep “terrorist elements” from escaping.294
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John Torpey’s book, The Invention of the Passport: Suveillance, Citizenship, and the
State, provides us with important background from which we can begin to understand how,
as he argues, the institutionalization of the nation-state system gives states “a monopoly of
the legitimate means of movement.”295 The nation-state project, which sought to create “a
homogenous ethno cultural unit,” necessarily entailed that people’s movement be
regulated.296 Through the invention of bureaucracies nation-states have thus deemed
themselves, not on only the sole users of the legitimate means of violence, but they are the
sole authorizers of the legitimate means of movement. This means that passports and
identification documents are always part and parcel of projects of inclusion and exclusion.
These documents determine the admission and refusal of entry of certain people to certain
territories, but they are also method of surveillance. Creating bureaucracies to hold up the
creation of identity documents and passports and hence monitoring movement is another
“state-building” activity just as “war-making” is. It demands that national communities not
just be “imagined” in the sense Benedict Anderson explained, but that they are also codified
in documents and law. State surveillance is carried out through these documents, and certain
categories of identities gain social significance through these documents, or again the lack
thereof. 297
For example, people have often referred to the Egyptian airport a “fishing net”
māṣeyāda. At the airport, in embassies, or in large bureaucratic buildings people directly
encounter embodiments of “states” that report and regulate their every movement; and if this
movement is authorized, it is only for a limited amount of time. Thus one must remember
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that all those who take to the sea in order to reach places where they feel life will be easier,
only do so after their visas are rejected and their desire to move is deemed unauthorized.
Smugglers and boats, after all, cost much more money than visas and plane tickets. In fact,
despite what the media says about the “crisis” of people supposedly “flooding” Europe, most
of those in need of it cannot afford the trip. People have to save up somewhere between two
thousand and three thousand dollars before they can begin to think of journeying to Europe.
Documents proved to be extremely important in this entire fieldwork experience,
primarily because I have not met a single Syrian person who does not have some kind of
document related problem. I did not have to ask questions relating to it, because the issue of
documents would always come up; documents are necessary for almost all of the everyday
practices we participate in. They are necessary for hospitals, schools, and almost all other
public services. After I was unable to go through with the security approval paper, I applied
for a Russian visa and emailed the Abkhazian foreign ministry and received my visa for
Abkhazia via e-mail.
Historicizing the passport and Soviet power in Abkhazia:
A brief historical overview of passports demonstrates that the document has not
always existed, nor has it held the same taken-for standard status that they may now. Passport
controls in Europe had initially been a temporary method, that accompanied states’
generalized anxieties about borders shortly before the start of the First World War, and the
anxiety had not ended when the war was over. Therefore passport measures that were that
were “temporary” persisted into the permanent.298 For example, in 1919 Germany, it was
already a permanent requirement for anyone passing into the Reich to possess a passport with
a visa. The United Kingdom also stabilized the Aliens Order of 1920, which stated that
anyone entering or leaving the country was required to posses “either a valid passport
298
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furnished with a photograph of himself or some other document satisfactorily establishing his
national status and identity” Similarly, the United States also say the end of what had been
termed “laissez faire migration.”299
In the period before and up to the First World War, the number of states that defined
and understood themselves in nationalist terms was in increasing while the AustroHungarian, the Russian, and the Ottoman empires were all collapsing. The growing
importance of national belonging, Torpey writes, “resulted in a profusion of bureaucratic
techniques for administering the boundaries of the nation, in both territorial and membership
terms…” These nations were the “crustacean types of nations,” the types that “crabbily
distinguish between us and them.”300Border controls intensified as the technological
possibilities for movement also improved, and this can give us an idea of how the passport as
a document served economic police and military interests and is not a timeless one. It has
instead, been reified over time due to certain sets of enforced political and social power
relations. Furthermore, it is interesting to reflect on this history whilst considering one of the
biggest contradictions of the capitalist world order. The contradictory tension of modern
states, between relying on immigrant cheap labor and not allowing the same labor in under
the idea that there is a lack of resources, or a lack of jobs, and that the ‘migrants will take our
jobs.’301
Bearing the more general European historical context in mind, one must look at the
Soviet context and how it pertains to a post-Soviet self –proclaimed state such as Abkhazia.
Two state security organizations existed and managed peoples’ lives in the Soviet Union, the
more popular KGB, (the committee for state security), and the less known MVD (“the
ministry of internal affairs of the U.S.S.R”). The MVD was the police organization
responsible for managing the soviet’s internal passport system, and peoples’ movements
299
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within the union. Within the MVD, there were two departments, one responsible solely for
those with people convicted with crimes, felons, and those with legal sentences more
generally and the second department was responsible for monitoring “regular” peoples’
affairs. The second department, also known as the “Soviet militia,” had a much of
“omnipresent” aura about it. One of this department’s functions was to administer and
enforce the internal passport system, by which it had also worked to acquire control of all
Soviet citizens.
After 1931, Soviet citizens could not find food nor housing unless they were properly
registered, and by extension also properly domiciled in the labour force. Employment, access
to housing, and basic needs and services were thus interlinked in a system of which the
backbone had been necessary documents. This is something that I argue we still see today
and is not unique to the Soviet Union era; even if it had taken a different form them. One
cannot be properly employed if one does not have the required identity documents, and often
residency and access to services depends on that.302 The internal passport regulated domestic
migration flows.
Movement inside the Soviet Union required a propiska, which is the equivalent of an
internal visa or residency permit and represent the “legal right” to live in a particular
administrative district within the union.303 In order to move to and live in a different district,
one had to apply for a propiska which in turn meant one had to prove employment and
residency in that district, which was not always the easiest thing for young people looking for
employment (as that meant they already had know someone willing to hire them before they
even moved to that district, and they had to provide “proof of housing” for being able to
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actually go look for the housing. In fact, this brings us to the ways in which is that
bureaucracy produces and reproduces homelessness.304
Before the dismantlement of the Soviet Union and since approximately 1934, a
section for ethnicity was an integral part, and a key feature, of the Soviet passport.305 It
“preserved” ethic differentiation in the soviet space. As is usually the case, some ethnic
categories benefitted from this passport feature, while for others, such as the Jews (who were
also categorized in passports) this policy was a clear disadvantage. By the time the union had
collapsed, the newly formed Russian had been made up of 21 ethnic republics, many of
which had later made claims to independence. State policy changed from one in which there
exited a mode of governing ethnic diversity to one in which individual ethnicity was to be,
for official purposes, irrelevant, and invisible. The policy followed from the (liberal) idea that
assimilation is “possible, desirable, and encouraged.”306
Timothy Blauvelt uses the Abkhaz case to argue that the early Soviet nationalities
policy was one way through which Soviet power was consolidated in the peripheries. He
argues that local Abkhaz “titular” elites were able to manipulate nationality policies, and the
structures of the local institutions “to gain control of patronage resources that in turn gave
them substantial local autonomy and authority” and to influence the decisions on Abkhazia’s
ethno-territorial status. Blauvelt also makes an important… During the time of the Russian
revolution, ethic categories in this region “were in reality probably somewhat flexible, as
peasants could sometimes adapt surnames to make themselves either Mingrelian/Georgian or
Abkhaz.” This depended on which category happened to be perceived as more
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advantageous.”307 Since the early 2000s, the vast majority of Abkhaz living near the Sochi
border, in Sukhum, and other cities have received Russian passports while the majority of the
Gali residents (the area bordering Georgia) carry Georgian passports.308 Russian policies
towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia made it so that the vast majority of residents (although
certainly now all) in those two areas were given Russian passports.
In a 2008 speech, marking the beginning of a Russian confrontation with Georgia,
Russian President DimitriMedvedev stated in an address to the South Ossetians: “I must
protect the life and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they are. We will not allow their
deaths to go unpunished.”309 The scholar, Florian Mühlfried points out the peculiarity of
Medvedev’s statement, which addressed “citizens” that were neither residents of the Russian
Federation, nor were they ethnically Russian.310 At the same time, the Russian state
encouraged attempts by the Abkhazian leadership to issue 'national' Abkhazian passports
were encouraged by the Russian government.
Years after Abkhazia had declared its independence from Georgia, in October 2005,
the Abkhazian parliament passed the, “Law of the Republic of Abkhazia on Citizenship of
the Republic of Abkhazia,” which was to define who is or is not eligible for citizenship.311 It
also set out the guidelines along how citizenship can be obtained. The ethnic Abkhaz that live
in Turkey, and the Circassians that are descendants of those who fled to the Ottoman Empire
in the nineteenth century are entitled to Abkhazian citizenship and are also allowed to
maintain dual nationality (or in other words, they do not have to relinquish their first
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nationalities.312The law becomes significant particularly with the (ethnic) Georgian
population, the Mingrelians, who hold Georgian citizenship.313
In order to acquire an Abkhazian passport, one must forfeit the Georgian passport, an
act that has various complex consequences for the approximately 40,000 Georgians who are
registered as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Georgia. The status of IDPs depends
primarily on this Georgian citizenship, and forfeiting this citizenship for an Abkhazian one
means also giving up the monthly allowances and other forms of support that they otherwise
would not have access to. According to media reports, these payouts are the only sources of
income for many people in this area. In these media reports, Abkhazian officials are quoted
saying that: "For the time being, it is impossible to allow Georgians dual citizenship purely
for the fact that we're still at a state of war with Georgia."314 The Georgian interior ministry
spokesperson is also cited in media reports saying that anyone who takes on an Abkhazian
citizenship automatically loses their right to be a Georgian citizen. Another factor is that of
the un-recognizability of the Abkhazian passport. Giving up an internationally recognized
passport such as the Georgian one, for the sake of an unrecognized (almost paralyzing if it’s
the one you hold) nationality such as the Abkhazian one. This media report quotes another
Gali resident saying he would probably take an Abkhazian passport since he cannot visit
Moscow with his Georgian one. "They won't take away my Georgian passport and I won't
swear to anything. There are ways to get around such things," the man is reported to have
said.315
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By the first morning I was there, I had made a visit to the building, located in the
center of Sukhum, Abkhazia’s capital. This building was an important one in this project,
partially also because it was a good place to first meet Syrians. I also met two Syrian women,
an aunt and her niece, who invited me to a picnic where I met many more Syrian women and
told them about the purpose of my visit, which is this research project. Small talk with
people often involved asking me whether I was getting my paperwork done. The commitet
building, like many other buildings in the country was covered in photos of people; the
photographs were of “Abazas,” “Abkhaz,” or “Circassians” in the diaspora and were
displayed in a manner that seemed to wish to show-off the status of these people abroad.
There were photographs of the Circassian associations in Jordan and some of those in Syria.
There was even one photograph of Maher Abaza, an Egyptian minister of electricity, with a
group of men from the Circassians in Jordan. Inside the small offices, where one could see
(Mubarak-like) photographs of other men whom I had known at the time, there was a Syrian
man, Rassem, who had been in Abkhazia for 20 years and spoke Russian fluently. He was
responsible for translating and for helping Arabic speakers get their paperwork done.
An Abkhazian woman was responsible for taking my paperwork which included, for
example, copies of my Egyptian passport, and she asked me repeatedly “Mama Arabka?” (Is
your mother Arab?). This constituted another one of the very strange moments of the trip,
because it was a question that assumed that while my mother was Arab, my father was not.
These moments exposed how strange and constructed categorical and “national” references
are at their very core.

Family Names, Codifying distinctions, borders and access to passports:
As I recounted in chapter one, it was a really strange moment when Rassem told me
to write down my first name and my “family” name, and then told me that “Abaza” was not a
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family name but a “nationality.” It is my surname, Abaza that made me (and many other
Syrians and Jordanians) legible for an Abkhazian passport. As Florian Mühlfried points out
surnames play a political and social role on borders in the region as they increasingly become
markers of ethnic identity.316 Family names, and the ways in which they are linked to
nationality, have come to play considerable roles along the Georgian, Ossetian, and
Abkhazian border regimes “even in relatively stable political situations.”317 The idea that
nationality is encoded in family name is thus seen as a signifier of belonging, and having the
“wrong” family name can even be risky.318 Mühlfried writes a small story he had heard in his
fieldwork in Georgia, although told to him as a joke, the anecdote is very telling of the
political and social dynamics surrounding documents, names and movement across the
Georgian and South Ossetian border. The anecdote belongs to a South Ossetia domestic
worker who lives in Tbilisi and decided to visit her family near the borders of South Ossetia.
Georgian soldiers stopped her and interrogated her, despite her Georgian passport, likely
because of her last name. It was not until the soldiers saw the business card of one of her
employers, a Swiss woman who works at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe that they led the Ossetian woman go.319 The anecdote exposes how family names
taken to reveal “Ossetian-ness” or in other cases Abkhazian-ness, or other nationalities on the
borders.320 With regards to border regimes, ethnicity, and family names, it is essential to note
that one of the initial conditions for the first plane-full of Syrians to Abkhazia was that they
be “Abazas.” This means for the first plane at least one of the spouses for the nuclear families
had to carry the last name “Abaza.” For the second plane, this condition was made more
flexible and people who were Circassian but had “Abaza” links were allowed to make the
316
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trip. For example Lara and her husband, who are both “Adghe” could not go onboard with
the first group setting off for Abkhazia, but with the second plane, Larisa was able to make
her case and go off to Abkhazia by saying that her mother is actually Abaza, although she
and her husband are not. In this case, your “ethnicity” is determined by your father, just as is
the case with me. In fact, getting your Abkhazian nationality is lengthier and more difficult
process if the link is through the mother rather than the father. By the time the third plane was
getting organized, one only had to be a Circassian to board it, as I have understood from
interlocutors.
There are various important points with regards to state bureaucracy and citizenship
paperwork. The most important ones include the politics (and violence) of waiting [for
paperwork, for benefits, etc.], the “gray zones” of state institutions (and their official, semiofficial, and unofficial practices), and the links between citizenship, nationality, benefits, and
“belonging.” The process of the codification of citizenship laws, was “directly motivated by
the need to establish who did and who did not have a right to the benefits of membership” to
various European states and saw its golden age in the nineteenth century.321 Nonetheless, we
live through the tangible and non-tangible effects of such processes of codifying belonging,
of codifying access to benefits and places, and of codifying identity and categories.
The politics of arbitrary preferences:
Maya sees the red bag on the store’s window display and gets giddy with
excitement. “It’s red!” she says, “I love red!” and we walk into the store to
have a look. She and May have to get school bags for the kids anyway, it’s
early September and schools are about to start again. For Maya’s kids, it will
be their first year of school in Abkhazia and I wonder how they will cope.
The red bag is really expensive, almost 5,000 rubles. There are other bags, and
everything is expensive. “Why don’t you go to Sochi and buy your things from
there?”, I ask her, “I can’t. There is no passport.”
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“Why?” I ask. She is not Abaza, it will take at least a year. May, who was also
looking for bags for her daughter, confirmed. Her husband and their passports
in a month while she had to wait for at least eight months, she said.

In Syria, “everyone was just sharkas.” I mentioned in chapter one that Rahma told me
this, and after she said it, I began to notice it further. When people introduce themselves and
find the need to add or state the “but I am Adghe” not Abaza, or my father is Kabarday Now
there are differences between the Abazas, the Adyghe, the Kabarday. Even the Russian
language teacher, Victoria, said that this is something that bothered her once, when I told her
about my research project. She pointed to this phenomenon as something that she saw as
divisive.322 She said that her children-students say things like “papa Adyghe, and mama
Abaza.” These alleged differences begin to matter not just when it comes to the amount of
time spent waiting for documents, but they matter when it comes to the amount of time one
spends waiting for an apartment. Syrians whose last names are “Abaza” get their Abkhazian
ID cards and their Abkhazian passports and nationalities in almost a month while others, who
are Circassian, have to wait for a few months to a year. Although this Abkhazian passport is
close to useless, it becomes an extremely useful document to have because it grants one
access to Sochi, Russia where it is much cheaper than Abkhazia to buy all kinds of necessary
goods. This politics of waiting (longer or less based on a surname) pertains to how the
struggle for movement, and “legal existence” (in this case in an entity deemed “illegal”)
constitute “temporal processes in and through which political subordination is
reproduced.”323 This politics of waiting is clearly not limited to Abkhazia, and this can be
shown in a question of how many families in Abkhazia are waiting for spouses and brothers
to arrange their paperwork so that the entire family can reunited in Europe (quite a few). For
them, their lives in Abkhazia are another form of waiting. It is through such processes and in
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the moment in which the question “where is your residency, iqama” or your passport or ID
card that domination is asserted.

“Make-Believe Documents”:324
~~~
Maysaa said she had to leave the Golan in 2013 when the terrorists came to her
neighborhood. I asked if she meant Daash and she said Jabhet Al-Nusra. “They
are supposed to give people a two hour warning before bombarding the
neighborhood, but they did not do that,” I wasn’t sure who she meant by that. I
asked her and she responded that the regime’s military “let the terrorists raid
our neighborhood… they left it.” She postulated that there may have been a
conspiracy between the terrorists and the security personnel that were supposed
to be protecting the neighborhood. “How could they just pass the military men
and their tanks so easily”, she asked both condemningly and rhetorically.
“So I just took the most important paperwork... people always say that the first
thing you should take with you is your paperwork,” Maysaa explained.

~~~
While, I have addressed literature on “the state” in earlier chapters, Veena Das’s
theorizations of the illegibility of the state are important when considering the document
production aspect of state-making. Das argues, in her ethnography on the Sultanpuri lowincome neighborhoods of India, that if one sees “how the authority of the state is literalized
and embodied in the contexts of violence,” then the state comes to be seen as “neither as a
purely rational-bureaucratic organization nor simply a fetish, but as a form of regulation that
oscillates between a rational mode and a magical mode of being.”325Das explains that the
state acquires a presence in the everyday lives of the communities she worked with through
practices that she calls “magical,” rather than as “fictitious.” She uses this wording for
various reasons, first, because this magic has very real consequences. Its forces are not
transparent and are often closely aligned to forces of danger, and “to engage in magic is to
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place oneself in a position of vulnerability.”326 Das therefore points to how certain
documentary practices of the state (she lists documents created by the Indian state), and the
utterances that embody such documents acquire a place in people’s everyday life practices.
While the state is both magical and rational, it is most of all marked by the ambiguity
between the two. In addition, Das, along with other scholars such as Navaro-Yashin, points to
how the clear cut distinction between the “state” and the “community” or “society” is a
problematic one given that in is in the sphere of the personal, the domestic, and the intimate
that the state and its forms of sociality are re-created and re-produced.327
In his article, “Documented lives: fear and the uncertainties of law during the second
Palestinian intifada” Tobias Kelly looks at how identity documents penetrate into the lives of
their holders while looking at the context of Palestinians in the West Bank during the second
intifada. Identity documents penetrate lives, “not as reifying abstractions but as an
unpredictable and unstable technique of governance producing fear and uncertainty for those
subject to their use.”328 He also adds that the production of identity documents creates “a
separation between the legal and the physical person,” and that people “come to embody the
indeterminacies of the passports they hold.” There are thus two aspects of personhood that
are recombined as the anxieties of documentation are personified in people’s daily lives. His
statements, although written about a different context, hold true in a variety of different
situations. Documents are held and made for uses of convenience rather than actual
“identifications.”329 It is also important to bear in mind that documents are not abstracted
entities, but they should be understood as in their wider institutional and political contexts.330
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One should ask, what are the conditions of their production as well as their reception? How
are they verified, or not, and how do they take effect?
Passports exist to limit, track, and control movement and people. There are people in
Damascus, Syria that cannot leave the country because the state does not want to issue
passports. There are too many people leaving already, and the rest should not have the option
of leaving as well, this is how the policies regarding documentation in Syria are thought out,
Madame Nari explained as she recounted that her sister a government worker who is very
tired, cannot leave because she is unable to obtain a passport. Again, this is an example of
documents are also there to maintain people in certain territories. The sadder aspect of the
fact that Madame Nari’s sister is stuck in Syria is that, even if she were able to obtain a
Syrian passport, she still will not be able to do much with it, due to the fact that even with
passports Syrians do not have access to even some of the countries closest to them. Egypt is
one example. Torpey’s claim that documents and passports also “make relevant differences
knowable and enforceable,” is this important when dealing with the fact that life in the world
today means that your passport determines where one’s existence will matter, and where it
will not even be allowed, or deemed “legal.”331
In order to better understand the situation and the daily lives of those Syrians living in
Abkhazia specifically, one has to put Abkhazia itself into historical, social, political, and
economic context. In this thesis, I follow from the argument that Abkhazia itself presents us
with a “space of exception.” Vincent Artman agues this in his article, “Documenting
Territory: Passportization, Territory, and Exception in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” In later
chapters I deal with the question of how and why Abkhazia can be analytically viewed as a
“space of exception.” In this chapter the act and notion of mass passportization is what
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provides us with some context as to what the manufacturing of passports and documents in
Abkhazia might mean.
As briefly mentioned above, the 2008 a mass-scale “passportisation” processes in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia altered Russia’s relationship with Georgia, which it had gone to
war with that very year and it altered Russia’s role in what are called the “frozen conflicts” of
that region. Russia distributed Russian passports to most of the residents of South Ossetia and
Abkhaiza, thus turning thousands into Russian citizens who can travel using their Russian
passports. In an article entitled “Citizenship, Identity and Foreign Policy: The Contradictions
and Consequences of Russia’s Passport Distribution in the Separatist Regions of Georgia,”
Scott Littlefield looks at the possible role that Russian passports and citizenship had in
facilitating an Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatism from Russia.332 For example,
Russia’s president at the time, Dimitri Medvedev was able to legitimize Russia’s highly
militarized response Georgian military aggression in Abkhazia by making use of Article 51
of the UN charter, invoking the “inherent right of individual” and “collective selfdefense.”333Medvedev was thus “protecting” Russian citizens.
Artman writes that it is not enough to argue that Russia made this move only in order
to justify its war with Georgia, despite the crucial role that move had played in the war.
Instead Artman argues that this wholesale conversion of the Abkhazians and South Ossetians
into Russian citizens “manufactured a casus belli and produced exceptional spaces within the
territory of the Republic of Georgia where the norms of international law and the modern
state system were effectively suspended.”334 Whereas Artman only discusses the Russian
passportization, I take his argument further to include the Abkhazian issuance of passports as
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also exploiting a still-potent discourse of the modern nation-state. Also, as Mühlfried’s points
out, “oddly enough, Abkhazian and South Ossetian citizenship are downplayed and
ultimately invalidated not only by Georgian, but also by Russian politics.335
The phenomenon of passportization had discursive, territorial, and biopolitical
consequences. Western media reports have often mislabeled the populations of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, who do not consider themselves ethnically Russian, by calling them Russian. .
Mühlfried writes that this confusion of categories “ethnicizes the notion of citizenship in the
public discourse to such an extent that Russian passport-holders in South Ossetia become
quasi-natural subjects of the Russian state.”336

These passports therefore function as

discursive and territorial symbols, reifying a symbolic linkage between a person and an
abstract polity, “whose normative value it simultaneously called into question.”337Both the
production of Russian passports for Abkhazians and the production of Abkhazian passports
for the people Abkhazia and others were processes that illustrated the contradictions inherent
in the norms and assumptions of the modern nation-state system. More specifically, these
processes disrupted traditional understanding of sovereignty, as Artman points out. These
processes, especially the Abkhazian state’s issuance of largely unrecognized passports, are
paradigmatic of the epistemic disruptions of neat categories and ideals of sovereignty in our
modern nation-sate system.338
Torpey argues that it is useful to think of states as “embracing” their citizens so that
people could be “in the reach of the state” or that they become in positions where they are
easy to locate.339 By embrace, Torpey means “to identify and gain enduring access to.”
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Regardless of whether one would rather view states as “embracing” citizens, or as Michael
Mann had written, as “caging” social activity within them, there are people -- usually
“unregistered” – that remain undesirable within that grasp. Or, in other words, states (and
others) codify “identities” in law, institutionalize them, and thereby render them socially
significant.340 The creation of these documents and nationalities not only enunciates, or I
would say constructs, differences but it implements them and that this how states successfully
assert their authority to determine who is included and who is excluded, or who “belongs”
and who does not. Relevant differences are made known and enforceable.341
The fact that Abkhazia and the categories upon which its institutions based their
paperwork were so unfamiliar to me made the process by which nation-states at large
produce (or render “legible”) nationalities and identification paperwork seem that much
random and fabricated. It made it that much easier to deconstruct the system by which
categories are institutionalized, and how surveillance is carried out through written
documents. To elaborate, the Abkhazian passports are registered in Russian records. The
passports are actually created based on other passports. In other words, to create an
Abkhazian passport if you are a Syrian citizen, you will need your Syrian passport. (If you
are Egyptian, the Abkhazian passport will be based on the information written in your
Egyptian passport, and so on and so forth). In the end, the passport goes through Russian
intelligence, where all the data is stored and put under heavy surveillance. The passport also
reveals if the passport holder is of Turkish, Jordanian, Syrian, Egyptian, or any other
nationality. This has implications on the ground that become visible when Russia, for
example, decides that Syrians will not pass the Russian-Abkhazian borders into Sochi, as it
had done during the World Olympics in 2014. Its implications are also present during border
interrogations. Whilst crossing the borders my father and I were asked, in broken English, if
340
341
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we were “Islam” (Muslim?) and then if we were “radical.” As if there was a possibility the
“radical” would have answered “yes!” From what I have observed, it does not seem that
Syrians cross the border into Russia often, and the “Arabs” that cross easily are likely to be
the ones who have Russian passports, otherwise these interrogations are the norm. I was once
telling Maha about how we (my father) got interrogated at the Egyptian airport, and she told
me they do that with all of the Arabs. One time, they went to Nalchik, and one their way back
soldiers/border security kept questioning them, and told them they were terrorists and so
Maha cried. She joked that the security let them pass because she cried.In her essay,
“Maddening States,” Aretxaga argues that the fetish or fantasy of state power plays itself out
in “expanding field of terrorism.” She adds that official documents “reproduce plots and
narrative forms from novels or films about terrorism.”342 From another angle, one could see
this as a state dependence on narratives of terrorist plots so as to be able to reproduce its
fetishistic qualities and practices, of which official documents and borders are a part of.
Concluding Remarks:
While we were waiting for the bus, we saw a gypsy woman carrying a mattress
and some pillows. Then Dina asked whether we have gypsies in Egypt, there
are many in Syria, she said. These people do not have passports and they just
travel all around wherever they want, she told her son.
~~~
Rahma’s mother said that some people who are “Arab” got their Abkhaz
passports and “they are not even Abazāt or Sharkas.” She believes that Sherief
Abaza, the Syrian former Member of Parliament and Baath party member who
worked at the commitet, gave them the nationality, “because they are friends,
maybe there is money involved,” she does not know. The rest of the
conversation was about Arabs and some of the things that differentiate Arabs
and Circassians.

~~~
There are a few Syrians who are not of Circassian origins, and although they are not
many their reasons for having gone to Abkhazia are varied. However, many such reasons
relate to the fact that because of their Syrian-ness they had no access to visas, or to other
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states, except by sea and this was not yet an option they had been willing to make. For
example Owais, a Syrian that is not Circassian went to Abkhazia, where he knew his uncle
was now living, after he tried to go to Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Algeria but all had by
then already closed their doors to Syrians. The reason he hadn’t tried to get out of the country
earlier was because he had not yet needed it to do so. It was only when he was called for
military service that leaving the country became ever so urgent. He is not happy in Abkhazia
where he works as a blacksmith despite his engineering degree.
The main point of this chapter it is to, again, point towards how this nation-state
system demands control over movement and how these practices of management have
structural violence embedded within them. The Syrian-Circassians in Abkhazia should not be
spoken of in vacuum; their presence in Abkhazia is part and parcel of the larger Syrian
diaspora’s current collective suffering, agency, and narratives. In this chapter I have argued
that bureaucracy, paperwork, documents, and passports are means by which states impose
authority; and they are products of social, political, and economic power relations. The
misrecognized violence they perpetuate also dwells in the intimate details of people’s
everyday lives. Maysaa, for example, a Homsi woman who married a Circassian man, stated
that the most important things that they had to take with them upon leaving their house
[heading to Turkey before Abkhazia became part of the plan] was their passports and papers.
Maysaa was living in the Damascus (reef Dimishq) after she got married, but her mother who
was in Homs and had experienced having to leave her home before Maysaa did, warned her
daughter about the paperwork and the passports. Since her mother’s warning, Maysaa made
sure to put all the family’s papers, and her wedding photographs, in her purse… which later
proved to have been a good idea because she did end up having to leave her house in a hurry,
barely carrying anything but her purse and children with her. The stories revolving around
paperwork are many; in Abkhazia there were many families also waiting for their fathers,
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husbands, brothers, etc. to do their lam el shaml -family reunion, including refugee status)paperwork for them so they could follow them over to Europe.
Buthaina Abaza (mentioned in the anecdote above) pointed out to me that she
appreciated that the Abkhazian state gave them the nationality and the passport. Yet, further
into the conversation, she expressed her belief that if Abkhazia were to accept more treaties
with Russia it would become stronger. However, the Abkhaizan people believe this would
hinder their independence and give Russia more control over them, she added. Well, she
continued, Russia already controls them anyway… and it would be better for the Syrians
because then they would be able to get Russian passports that would allow them to go
“anywhere in the world.” The question of why sites of power do not allow people to go
“anywhere in the world” may seem simple, utopian, idealistic, or illogical for some. Yet, to
bring it forth persistently, is to again, to put under the spotlight the taken-for-granted, still
widely accepted fact that the ‘undesirables’ are kept from going “anywhere in the world”
while others are not because of the repressive politics of passport colors. 343 Sometimes,
preferences of nationalities come to be based almost solely on their practical use when it
comes to navigating movement.
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Conclusion

I was sitting with Rahma and Heba, laughing at their jokes (as you can tell, the people
I met in Abkhazia were very witty, clever, funny and fun to be around), when Heba looked at
me and asked me when I was going to start doing my research. “You’re going to fail!” she
joked. “Let’s start now, I’ll interview you,” I said taking out my notebook and opening up the
page where I had written up some questions “I’ll tell you everything you need to know about
Abkhazia,” Rahma said smiling, “but Jihad, you know despite everything, if it weren’t for the
war in Syria 99% of the Syrians that are here wouldn’t be here,” Heba interrupted, reminding
me that Syrian presence or return or migration to Abkhazia did not happen in vacuum, out of
nowhere and out of context. It is not strange, and is very much aligned with what is
happening to the larger Syrian-national Diaspora and people. On several separate occasions,
after long pauses between dialogues, without any seeming prerequisite people (Amany’s
mother and Suzanne’s mother) would say in a melancholic tone, “we were happy in Syria, we
were living the best life.” And I couldn’t respond. Any response seems futile. What could I
possibly say? Thinking of a way to conclude also seems futile. I am trying to squeeze what is
left of my brain cells, hoping for little drops of consoling ideas to write down but there is
really no “conclusion.”344
I have tried here to dismantle, or at least provide a different perspective on, the
notions of the refugee, the state/ modern nation-state, war, and the document, which are all
very interlinked notions. I argued that the state is “imagined” and that states that are
perceived as unreal in the international arena (by the UN, and other nation-states) can tell us
about the “real,” or about what is beyond the imaginary. Ethnicity, nation, and nationalism –
again notions with intimate relations to the processes of statehood—are more arbitrary than
344
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people are usually programmed to believe. These notions are then linked to wars- social
conditions- in different parts of the world and in different moments in time (sometimes same
war in a different moment), and these wars have structural consequences. Explaining these
wars through simplistic ethnic categories is problematic. For this point we can invoke
Navaro-Yashin, who says that the conflict in Northern Cyprus is perceived as a conflict
between “ethnic” Greeks and “ethnic” Turks—there are always “sides” in a war, as imagined
in international discourse.345 Yet such discourse obscures talk of the political, the economic
and the social by focusing on the “ethnic” or the “sectarian.” Finally, earlier chapters
involved the notion of the “fictitious,” but maintained that this “fictitious,” has very real, felt
consequences- which the discussion of structural violence, state killing and letting die, was a
part of. The state’s monopoly over the legitimate means of movement and border/wallbuilding practices are another example of these consequences. The fate of one’s “legitimate”
or “legal” access to places depends on the will of the “state” or state officials and their
practices. 346 Abkhazia, with its contested sovereignty and the contested sovereignty of the
children of the broom closet inside the broom closet bother legitimizes and dismantles this
globalized system of control through passports and the politics of documents by knowingly
producing unrecognized passports.
This thesis, as a process that led to me to these questions, unfolded interestingly and
left me with more questions than answers. To recap, I ended up in Abkhazia, a place I had
only heard of a few years earlier and even then had not paid any particular attention to,
through a strange twist, which one can call the coincidence of fieldwork. Through my
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surname, Abaza, I found a thread of connection between me and Abkhazia, and the many
Syrians now living there, many of whom share the same surname. The surname was a
gateway that allowed me to get an Abkhazian passport, a process that I have detailed
throughout the pages above. Relying heavily on participant observation, narratives and
informal interviews as well as on the conceptual works of anthropologists/theorists such as
Yael Navaro-Yashin, Elizabeth Povinelli, Veena Das, Liisa Malkki, Wendy Brown, Girogio
Agamben, as well as other theorists of the state, I was able to rethink many of my own
preconceptions of the state.
Earlier in the thesis, I put forth questions related to my very specific case of
fieldwork: Why and how did this group of Syrians end up in the North Caucasus? I provide
the historical narratives that had been concurrently invoked in my fieldwork experience to
make sense of how Syrians of Circassian background or descent are now going through
processes of “repatriation” in Abkhazia.
I move readers and myself back into critically questioning what has been lately
termed “the refugee crisis,” and to contextualize perceptions surrounding the construction of
the “refugee” and more recently, “the Syrian refugee,” which is becoming a category in its
own right. What does the displacing, emplacing, and replacing of populations tell us about
the corporeal functions of state power, including border policing practices and national
imaginings of exclusion? Syrian repatriation in Abkhazia is taking place while ethnic
Georgians and Mingrelians, forcibly evicted from their homes in 1992, remain on the
outskirts of the Abkhazian/Georgian border.
What sort of implications do our acts of naming hold? Would it make a difference if
we were to trade the term “refugee crisis” with “refugee issue,” or maybe rethink the term
“refugee”? What about policies and states and people? How are these three huge notions,
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constantly spoken of within the framework of the “refugee crisis,” linked, imagined, and
thought of?
As Wendy Brown may ask, what do the phenomena of walling, barricading, and
policing borders from refugees tell us about waning state sovereignty? Who then is entitled to
the sovereignty to produce citizens, to control borders and territory? The questions to put
forth for future study and reflection are many. Another question, inspired by Professor Hanan
Sabea, and Agamben’s conception of “the logic of the camp” is how can we deepen the link
between how we think of the notions of “the state” and “refugee”? What can we make of
considering the ways in which Abkhazia becomes a besieged and somehow “refugee-d”
space? By linking nations and spaces to war, we can pose the question: how we are to make
sense of the structural violence that is often obscured through a fetishized focus of only the
moments of extreme physical violence?
As argued above, all of these questions and their implications have affects on the
everyday lives of people. The imposed authority of documents and control over movement,
even in the act of making people wait for paperwork, is another means of manifesting power
over them. In fact, the point should be made clearer, that if it was easier for Syrians to get
visas, they would not have to go through the complications of figuring out other ways to
navigate their movements. The privileges or detriments that accompany the color of one’s
passport are very much a part of the politics of imagined nations, the lives that matter, and
lives that do not.
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